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Mark Spottswood† 
Abstract 
This Article offers a new account of legal fact-finding based on the 
dual-process framework in cognitive psychology. This line of research 
suggests that our brains possess two radically different ways of 
thinking. “System 1” cognition is unconscious, fast, and associative, 
while “System 2” involves effortful, conscious reasoning. Drawing on 
these insights, I describe the ways that unconscious processing and 
conscious reflection interact when jurors hear and decide cases. Most 
existing evidential models offer useful insights about the ways that 
juries use relevant information in deciding cases but fail to account 
for situations in which their decisions are likely to be affected by 
irrelevant stimuli.  The dual-process approach, by contrast, is able to 
explain both probative and prejudicial influences on decision making. 
As a demonstration, I use the dual-process framework to explain the 
surprising result in People v. Rivera, a case in which a jury convicted 
a man of rape and murder despite the admission of exonerating DNA 
evidence. This result, I suggest, was not the product of an unusually 
lazy or unreasonable jury but rather illustrates the way that our 
ordinary cognitive processes can lead us to endorse quite unreasonable 
results if primed using certain common prosecutorial strategies.  
After elaborating the dual-process model in a descriptive form, I 
then consider some of its normative implications. Many leading 
evidence scholars have argued that verdicts resting on “pure” or 
“naked” statistical evidence are problematic. Although the dual-
process model of fact-finding is descriptive rather than normative, it 
nevertheless provides surprising insight into this debate by showing 
that our intuitive discomfort with verdicts that are based on purely 
statistical data may arise from the failure of such evidence to speak in 
terms that our unconscious, intuitive System 1 can process reliably. In 
such circumstances, intuitions about outcomes should be treated with 
caution. Thus, what unites the seemingly disparate examples of the 
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Rivera trial and the naked statistical evidence debate is that, in both 
contexts, it feels right to do wrong. 
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Introduction 
For quite some time, evidence scholars have debated which 
framework—among several competing alternatives—best describes the 
process by which judges and juries evaluate evidence and make 
verdict decisions.1 This discussion has centered on two rival accounts 
of fact-finding. The “Bayesian” family of inferential models seeks to 
account for evidential analysis in probabilistic terms, with each new 
item of evidence contributing to changes in jurors’ estimations of how 
likely it is that disputed facts are true.2 A competing group of 
 
1. See generally Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship 
Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 
949, 984–97 (2006) (discussing the “New Evidence Scholarship” and the 
extended debate between Bayesians and their critics). 
2. See, e.g., Joseph B. Kadane & David A. Schum, A Probabilistic 
Analysis of the Sacco and Vanzetti Evidence 26–27 (1996); 
Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to 
Identification Evidence, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 498–501 (1970); John 
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. 
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theorists asserts that fact-finding involves the construction and 
comparison of stories, or narratives, and the fact finder chooses the 
narrative that best explains the given pattern of trial evidence, 
without any separate consideration of individual probabilities.3  
In this Article, I reflect on the shortcomings of both the Bayesian 
and story-comparison frameworks as descriptions of how jurors 
determine facts in the messy environment of real-world trials. Both 
approaches fail to account adequately for the unconscious aspects of 
fact-finding.4 And, unfortunately, we cannot fully comprehend how 
real jurors are likely to process evidence unless we account for 
prejudice and associative intuition in addition to more rational styles 
of inference.5  
 
Rev. 1065, 1083–91 (1968) (applying Bayes’ rule to the fact-finding 
process in criminal proceedings); David Kaye, The Paradox of the 
Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 101, 106–08 (analyzing 
statistical evidence under the Bayesian probability formula); Richard O. 
Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1022–1041 (1977) 
(applying Bayes’ rule to the meaning of evidentiary rules regarding 
relevance). 
3. See, e.g., Floris Bex & Douglas Walton, Burdens and Standards of 
Proof for Inference to the Best Explanation, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS: JURIX 2010: THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE 37, 38–45 (Radboud G.F. Winkels ed., 2010) (advancing a 
“hybrid theory” as a model of reasoning for burdens of proof); Edward 
K. Cheng, Essay, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale L.J. 
1254, 1269–71 (2013) (proposing a probabilistic implementation of the 
story-comparison approach); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and 
Trial, 101 Geo. L.J. 281, 286–92 (2013) (evaluating the relationship 
between narrative theory and factual accuracy at trials); John R. 
Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, 
22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1621, 1626–27 (2001) (discussing the 
considerations undertaken during an abductive thought pattern); 
Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best 
Explanation, 27 L. & Phil. 223, 224–25 (2008) (contending that the 
Bayesian theory overlooks “explanation-based reasoning”); Nancy 
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 519–20 (1991) 
(introducing the “Story Model” as an alternative to Bayesian theory).  
4. See discussion infra Part I.C.  
5. A focus on the irrational or unconscious aspects of fact-finding has been 
comparatively rare, with little attention paid to it in the inferential 
modeling debates. The main counterexamples to this trend are Dan 
Simon’s work on coherence networks, Dan Simon, A Third View of the 
Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decisionmaking, 71 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 511, 512–13 (2004), and some aspects of Nancy Pennington & Reid 
Hastie’s Story Model, see, e.g., Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’ 
Decisions, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 991, 999–1004 (2001); Nancy Pennington 
& Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for 
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 189, 
193–96 (1992) (describing the impact on verdict outcomes after 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding 
134 
To see the shortcomings of purely rationalist models, consider 
People v. Rivera,6 a case in which an Illinois jury convicted a man for 
raping and murdering a child despite compelling forensic DNA 
evidence that a different, unidentified person committed the crime.7 
Rivera arose from the death of eleven-year-old Holly Staker in 1992.8 
Almost twenty years after her murder, an Illinois jury was called to 
decide, for the third time,9 whether Juan Rivera committed the 
crime.10 The facts of the case were gruesome: the killer had kicked in 
the door of the apartment where Holly worked as a babysitter, raped 
her both vaginally and anally, and then stabbed and strangled her 
until she was dead.11 And the prosecution had an excellent card to 
play: when questioned by the police, Rivera had confessed to the 
crime.12 In addition to this confession, the State offered evidence 
showing that Rivera had tried to concoct a fictitious alibi for the 
night of the crime and that other jail inmates had also heard him 
confess to the killing.13 Based on the prosecution’s evidence alone, it 
would seem like an easy case for conviction.  
Once the defense had its say, however, the picture looked 
strikingly different. According to new and uncontradicted expert 
testimony, DNA samples taken from the semen recovered during 
Holly’s autopsy did not match Rivera’s DNA profile.14 What is more, 
Rivera was on electronic home monitoring when the crime was 
committed, and there were no records suggesting that he had left his 
home that night.15 To explain Rivera’s confession, the defense offered 
 
modifying evidence presentation order and varying witness credibility in 
an experiment). 
6. No. 92 CF 2751 (Ill. 19th Cir. Ct. May 8, 2009), rev’d 962 N.E.2d 53 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011).  
7. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 62–63 (reversing and finding the evidence 
insufficient to support a verdict of guilty); see also Andrew Martin, The 
Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2011, § 6 
(Magazine), at 42 (discussing the exculpatory DNA evidence in Rivera’s 
case). 
8. 962 N.E.2d at 55. 
9. The case was tried twice previously. The first verdict was overturned 
due to procedural errors, and the second was vacated in 2006 based on 
the newly available exculpatory DNA evidence. Id. at 55–56. 
10. Id. at 56. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 57.  
13. Id. at 57–58. 
14. Id. at 58–59. 
15. See Transcript of Trial at 017578 to 017616, People v. Rivera, 
No. 92 CF 2751 (Ill. 19th Cir. Ct. May 8, 2009) [hereinafter Trial Tr.]. 
There was some evidence that electronic home-monitoring systems 
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evidence that he had a low IQ that bordered mental retardation; that, 
during a break between police interviews, jail medical personnel had 
witnessed him behaving in ways suggesting psychosis; that his story 
had changed in response to leading questions by the police; and that 
his initial confession was inconsistent with the facts of the actual 
crime.16  
In other words, despite the vivid evidence connecting Rivera to 
the crime, he was probably—indeed, almost certainly—not the man 
who raped and killed Holly Staker. The jury in Rivera’s case, having 
heard all of this evidence, was instructed that Rivera was presumed 
innocent and should be convicted only if the jury was convinced of his 
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”17 After four days of deliberations, 
they concluded that this standard had been met, finding him guilty.18 
The result was decried in the media and then eventually reversed on 
the ground that the evidence had been insufficient to permit any 
reasonable jury to convict.19  
It is hard to know what to make of the jurors’ inability to see 
reasonable doubt in this pattern of evidence. Although the case was 
disturbing, some might wish to construe this as an isolated event with 
little overall import.20 The criminal jury, after all, is selected in a 
quasi-random fashion from members of the general public, and every 
so often that process might select a highly unreasonable group of 
people by a mere quirk of statistics. Seen in this light, the case could 
be viewed as the random result of a deck stacked against an innocent 
defendant, in which an overzealous prosecutor21 and a judge who had 
 
occasionally fail to record violations, but there was no direct evidence 
regarding any known malfunctions with Rivera’s own monitoring 
system, which had, at other times, notified the government of Rivera’s 
violations of his house arrest restrictions. Id.  
16. 962 N.E.2d at 60; Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 18294. 
17. Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018194. 
18. 962 N.E.2d at 60. 
19. Id. at 67–68. 
20. But see Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where 
Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 1–13 (2011) (providing a survey 
of wrongful conviction cases, paying particular attention to the frequent 
abuse of confessions and eyewitness evidence); id. at 100–02 (describing 
other similar cases in which a conviction was obtained despite 
exonerating DNA evidence). 
21. See Martin, supra note 7, at 47–48 (describing lead prosecutor Andrew 
Mermel’s staunch insistence on obtaining and defending convictions in 
multiple cases involving exclusionary forensic evidence or confessions by 
third parties). 
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already made up his mind that Rivera was guilty22 allowed a weak 
case to go before a jury that was either unusually lazy or biased, or 
both. But I believe this case deserves closer study. The jury’s decision 
in Rivera can be explained in terms of well-studied features of 
unconscious cognition that we all share.23 This explanation, in turn, 
makes the trial both more understandable and more disturbing, 
because it implies that other juries, even if well motivated, might 
have reached the same perplexing result if exposed to a similar 
pattern of evidence.24  
To provide an account of fact-finding that can explain cases like 
Rivera, we must depart significantly from the rationalist tradition of 
evidential modeling, in search of a framework that can accommodate 
prejudicial inferences as well as reasonable inferences. If we limit 
ourselves to rational inferences about probabilities and coherent 
narratives founded on the admitted evidence, we will be at a loss to 
explain why twelve ordinary people could have thought that it was 
not just probable, but beyond any reasonable doubt, that Rivera was 
Holly’s killer. What we need, instead, is a similarly robust way to 
analyze and describe the way that the jury’s views about what 
inferences were and were not reasonable were shaped, in significant 
part, by irrelevant or prejudicial factors that operated largely outside 
the jury’s awareness. 
Although evidence scholars have spent a substantial amount of 
time chronicling particular ways that we might fall prey to 
unconscious biases in the courtroom,25 few scholars have incorporated 
 
22. See id. at 68 (noting the defense lawyers’ concern that the judge who 
had twice convicted Rivera was unfairly favoring the prosecution in 
evidentiary rulings). 
23. See discussion infra Part III. 
24. Cf. Garrett, supra note 20, at 100 (noting fifteen other cases in which 
defendants were convicted despite the admission of exonerating DNA 
evidence).  
25. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1124, 1128–35 (2012) (focusing on implicit bias based on the 
party’s racial identification); Saul M. Kassin & David A. Garfield, Blood 
and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of Videotaped Crime 
Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J. Applied Soc. Psych. 1459, 1465–70 
(1991) (providing empirical evidence on the impacts of gore evidence on 
verdict decisions in mock trials); Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter 
McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 
97 Cornell L. Rev. 255, 256–59 (2012) (exploring the impacts of a 
defendant’s bad moral character on a mock juror’s construal of evidence 
items); D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old 
Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for 
Heartstrings and Gore, 49 Hastings L.J. 403, 445 (1998) (suggesting 
that gruesome or shocking evidence of a crime’s consequences may 
encourage juries to subtly downplay their doubts in favor of a 
conviction). 
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these scattered insights into the broader accounts of inference at 
trial.26 We lack, in other words, a framework in which we can examine 
inferential prejudice in the organized and systematic way that the 
Bayesian and story-comparison accounts bring to the analysis of 
inferential probity.  
In this Article, I develop a systemic account of the ways that 
unconscious cognitive processes interact with the more familiar 
aspects of judge and jury decision making.27 In so doing, I will draw 
heavily on the dual-process tradition in cognitive psychology. This 
dual-process framework, which cognitive scientists developed to 
explain a wide variety of seemingly conflicting results in psychological 
research, posits that our mental processes can be better understood if 
we group them into two competing cognitive “systems” operating side 
by side in human decision making.28  
 
26. For the best-developed prior work in this direction, see Simon, supra 
note 5 (developing an associative-network model of inference that 
incorporates the phenomenon of coherence shifts) and Paul Thagard, 
Why Wasn’t O.J. Convicted? Emotional Coherence in Legal Inference, 
17 Cognition & Emotion 361 (2003) (reviewing four different 
computational models explaining O.J. Simpson's acquittal and arguing 
that the emotional coherence model is the most plausible explanation).  
27. Other authors have suggested that this literature might prove useful as 
a means of elucidating the mechanics of fact-finding, but few have 
explored the question in depth. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 3, at 299–
300 (describing how doubt and difficulty may prompt jurors to abandon 
logic and utilize an unconscious and associative process when making 
decisions); Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 
Vand. L. Rev. 143, 184–85 (2011) (analyzing non-evidential aspects 
that pose a threat to the integrity of criminal verdicts). The most 
detailed attempt to date at analyzing fact-finding in dual-process terms 
appears in an article by Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, and 
Andrew J. Wistrich, who replicated some cognitive-bias experiments 
using judges as research participants. After showing that judicial 
intuition can sometimes lead to errors, they suggest that errors can be 
systematically reduced by encouraging judges to engage in more 
deliberative styles of processing. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 
93 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 42–43 (2007). As discussed in Parts III and IV 
of this Article, my own model complicates this picture substantially by 
showing that deliberation will often be used to justify and defend 
intuitive conclusions rather than to override them. 
28. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 19–30 
(2011) (introducing “System 1” and “System 2” as two modes of 
thinking); Keith E. Stanovich, Rationality and the Reflective 
Mind 3–25 (2011) (explaining the “dual-process theory” and its role 
within the “Great Rationality Debate”); Timothy D. Wilson, 
Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive 
Unconscious 17–40 (2002) (discussing the “adaptive unconscious” and 
its effects on decision making). 
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One kind of cognition, frequently called “System 1,” operates 
unconsciously and rapidly, producing intuitions that rise to our 
attention without any preceding awareness of a problem-solving 
process at work.29 We rely on such unconscious cognition during every 
moment of our waking lives, often without realizing it: when we 
recognize a face in a crowd, when we drive a car along a familiar 
route, or when we correctly interpret another person’s emotional state 
based on subtleties of their tone of voice or posture, we are 
performing complicated reasoning that feels effortless.30  
Another kind of cognition, “System 2” for short, often involves 
the effortful manipulation of thoughts and images in working memory, 
or the focus of conscious attention on a particular target.31 System 2 is 
strikingly different from System 1 in several important ways: we 
notice and perceive the work involved in System 2 cognition, we find 
it effortful and tiring to sustain it for very long, and when we employ 
it we are constrained by a limited fund of working memory space.32 
Thus, when we do challenging arithmetic in our heads or analyze the 
import of an unfamiliar and poorly drafted statute, we find it 
necessary to focus and avoid distractions in order to finish the task, 
and we will grow tired the longer we persist. Shifting into System 2 
thinking offers us the special power to solve problems without 
recourse to the patterns of our past experience. But the limited 
capacity of this resource means that we can only focus its power on 
one problem at a time and must maintain focus and motivation to use 
it for any significant length of time. 
Dual-process cognitive theory gives us powerful tools with which 
to understand cases like Rivera. As I will show in this Article, the 
prosecution in Rivera made use of a number of standard rhetorical 
strategies that would have been likely to induce strong implicit 
associations between Rivera and guilt in the minds of the jurors. Chief 
among these strategies was the early use of gruesome crime scene 
details, the effort to paint Rivera as a generally untrustworthy person, 
 
29. See Keith Frankish & Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, The Duality of Mind: 
An Historical Perspective, in In Two Minds: Dual Processes and 
Beyond 1, 15–18 (Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish eds., 
2009) [hereinafter TWO MINDS] (providing a survey of features associated 
with System 1 and System 2 in the dual-process literature). 
30. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 19–22 (introducing key features of 
System 1 and System 2). 
31. See id. at 22–24 (providing examples such as focusing on a particular 
person's voice in a crowded and noisy room or parking in a narrow 
space). 
32. See id. (“[In System 2 situations,] you must pay attention, and you will 
perform less well, or not at all, if you are not ready or if your attention 
is directed inappropriately.”). 
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and the introduction of redundant and repetitive testimony regarding 
Rivera’s confessions.33 By using these common techniques, the 
prosecution generated an intuitive sense of Rivera’s guilt that 
outstripped the real probity of the evidence it had to offer. The 
defense, by contrast, had analytically powerful evidence that was not 
nearly so well designed to generate a competing set of associative 
intuitions.34 The result was that the jury most likely started 
deliberations with the intuition that Rivera was probably guilty, 
despite the defense’s strong case.  
The final piece of the Rivera puzzle incorporates analytic, 
System 2 processing: the jury spent four days in deliberations, most 
likely finding ways to minimize their doubts about their intuitively 
preferred result so as to accommodate both their unconsciously 
derived preference for a guilty verdict and the instruction requiring 
them to find Rivera innocent unless his guilt was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.35 In the end, we need to consider the work done by 
both cognitive systems to explain why it might have felt reasonable 
and proper for the jury to vote to convict, or to predict when 
particular kinds of evidence might encourage other juries to reach 
similarly unreasonable decisions. 
The utility of a dual-process model of fact-finding goes beyond 
explaining the disturbing result in one case. We can also apply its 
insights to evidence theory itself, as a means of identifying scenarios 
where widely shared, normative intuitions about the proper force of 
proof are likely to be unreliable. To illustrate this, I use the dual-
process model to reconsider the appropriate weight to give “naked” 
statistical evidence at trials. Many influential scholars argue that it 
violates fundamental values of fairness or legitimacy to allow jurors to 
rest their verdicts on purely statistical evidence.36 At some deep level, 
 
33. See infra notes 190–210 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 211–22 and accompanying text.  
35. See Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018194. 
36. See, e.g., L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 74–
76, 270–72 (1977) (arguing that, in some cases, the verdict that has the 
higher probability is nevertheless unfair); Cheng, supra note 3, at 1265–
66 (“[T]he legal system wants the jury to arrive at some narrative of the 
truth.”); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof 
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1378–85 
(1985) (arguing that awarding proportionate judgment in situations 
involving statistical damages cases and developing an accompanying 
substantive legal rule is “the primary objective of judicial factfinding”); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the 
Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1340–41, 1346–50 (1971) 
(“[A] . . . similarity among the cases . . . is less easily dismissed: in all of 
them, making use of mathematical information first requires 
transforming it from evidence about the generality of cases to evidence 
about the particular case before us.”). 
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these theorists urge, it feels wrong to determine liability or guilt based 
on a guess, even if that guess is more probable than its alternatives.37 
But this apparent tension is driven in large part by the failure of 
statistical forms of proof to speak to our unconscious System 1 in a 
way that would make us feel that the statistically stronger inference is 
intuitively true. In fact, the ways that our intuitive patterns of 
reasoning betray us when analyzing these hypotheticals closely 
parallel what went wrong in the Rivera trial. Both scenarios involve 
analytically powerful evidence that nevertheless lacks the sort of 
vivid, repetitive detail that can support strong intuitions about guilt 
or innocence within our underlying associative system of cognition. 
This insight should moderate, if not eliminate entirely, our anxieties 
about statistical proof. Taken in connection with the examination of 
what went wrong in the Rivera case, this suggests a broader lesson: 
before relying on our intuitions about proper case outcomes as a 
normative guide for optimal juridical decision making, we should first 
make sure that the process generating those intuitions is generally 
likely to lead to accurate outcomes. 
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I introduces existing 
models of fact-finding. Part II relates several important aspects of 
dual-process cognitive theory that will form the basis of my own 
account of fact-finding in the trial environment. Part III presents a 
descriptive model of the ways that the two systems of cognition are 
likely to operate and interact as a fact finder processes the evidence in 
a disputed trial, using the Rivera trial as a discussion example. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the importance of accounting for the hidden 
associative component of fact-finding cognition when we consider the 
utility of purely statistical proof at trial. With this discussion, I hope 
to introduce an important new framework for future discussions of 
problems in evidence law, one that can accommodate not just the role 
of reasoned analysis in fact-finding but also the murky terrain of 
hunches, insights, and prejudices. 
I. Existing Models of Fact-Finding  
A vast amount of scholarship has attempted to provide either 
formal models or informal accounts of the process by which judges 
and juries find facts in disputed cases. A full account of this tradition 
is well beyond the scope of one article and indeed would be hard to 
 
37. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 36, at 75 (illustrating how it seems unjust 
for A to lose when he is one of 1,000 people at a rodeo, of which 499 
paid and 501 did not, because it is more likely than not that he did not 
pay). For further discussion of this hypothetical, refer to notes 80–81 
and accompanying text. 
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cover in a lengthy book.38 My aims in this introduction are far more 
modest. First, I will explore the major purposes for which these 
models can be used. Second, I will describe the primary tension that 
currently divides the literature analyzing how judges and juries reach 
verdict decisions—with formal models founded on probability theory 
on one side and, on the other side, informal models that emphasize 
the construction and comparison of “stories” or “narratives.” Finally, 
I will offer a critique of the tendency in this literature to rely 
primarily on introspective reflection as a means of understanding how 
juries reach decisions, and its comparative lack of attention to other 
ways that we can learn about fact-finding. 
A. The Multiple Uses of Evidence Models 
Before I stretch the patience of readers by describing probability 
networks, abductionist inference, or unconscious associative cognition, 
it is worth justifying the essential utility of these abstruse endeavors. 
Models of fact-finding inference have real-world value for anyone who 
wishes to determine when, and how, our current trial practices might 
be improved, and this value makes it worthwhile to spend time 
pondering these abstractions. More particularly, there are at least 
three different reasons we might want to model the proof process.39  
First, we might wish to build descriptive models of fact-finding to 
better understand the fact-finding behavior of real-world juries and 
judges. A good descriptive model aims to describe the processes by 
which fact finders mentally process case evidence in order to reach 
verdict decisions.40 For such a model, the criterion of success is not 
whether the standards of factual inference it encodes are rational, 
ideal, or consistent with judicial doctrine or expectations. Rather, a 
 
38. For a short introduction to this literature, see generally Park & Saks, 
supra note 1, at 984–97 (providing a background on “New Evidence 
Scholarship”). For an excellent book-length treatment, see generally 
DAVID A. SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC 
REASONING (1994) (collecting insights about evidence from different 
disciplines).  
39. Cf. Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the 
Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 439, 440–50 (1986) (discussing 
various reasons why theorists would seek to construct inferential 
models); Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence 
Theory, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 549–57 (2013) (discussing the 
dichotomy between descriptive and normative accounts of proof); see 
also Peter Tillers, Trial by Mathematics—Reconsidered, 
10 L. Probability & Risk 167, 172 (discussing various ways in which 
formal models of inference can be useful). 
40. See Lempert, supra note 39, at 448–50 (considering whether the 
Bayesian approach can be employed as a descriptive model); Pennington 
& Hastie, supra note 5, at 189–92 (elaborating one detailed descriptive 
account of proof, the “Story Model”). 
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descriptive model succeeds to the extent that it improves our 
understanding of how fact finders translate a trial’s inputs, in terms of 
evidence, procedures, arguments, and instructions, into outputs, in 
the form of findings of fact and verdict decisions. Without this 
understanding, we would have difficulty identifying when we need to 
intervene in natural reasoning processes by means of evidentiary 
rulings, and we would also be hard-pressed to predict how 
interventions would impact juries. Just as a contractor would be ill 
advised to start excavating a foundation before conducting a survey of 
the ground, we risk acting contrary to our own interests if we 
interfere with a fact-finding process whose mechanics we do not grasp. 
Second, we might wish to construct normative models in order to 
articulate both the goals we wish to optimize in the fact-finding 
process and particular ways that we could go about achieving such 
goals.41 If the descriptive model of evidence acts like a survey, then 
the normative model acts like a blueprint, illustrating a desired form 
that we might wish fact-finding inference to take. Sometimes a 
normative model might function as an ideal standard against which 
we measure real-world fact-finding.42 In other circumstances, it might 
be adjusted to reflect the perceived limitations of real-world fact 
finders and to seek second-best improvements given those limits.43 In 
either case, we will find it hard to know whether the existing trial 
process works well, or how it can be improved, without a good 
normative model of proof.  
Third, we might wish to create doctrinal models that seek to 
describe significant features of evidentiary doctrines or judicial 
attitudes about the nature of fact-finding.44 Doctrinal models can be 
of great use to evidence theorists. They may help us predict future 
 
41. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Audrey Chia & Samuel Lindsey, The Random 
Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 
35 Jurimetrics J. 201, 211–16 (1995) (employing a Bayesian normative 
model to identify inferential errors in mock-jury decision making); 
Lempert, supra note 39, at 443–48 (discussing a use of Bayes’ rule as a 
normative model). 
42. See, e.g., Koehler, Chia & Lindsey, supra note 41, at 211–16 (showing 
how jurors, when weighing the value of a DNA match, tend to 
overestimate the importance of random match probability in comparison 
to a normative model). 
43. See Pardo, supra note 39, at 559 (suggesting that normative models fail 
if they cannot provide guidelines that real-world fact finders are capable 
of implementing).  
44. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 39, at 446–47 (labeling such models as 
“heuristic devices” that “treat[] the law’s rules and procedures as 
normative and attempt[] to model them”); Lempert, supra note 2, at 
1021–22 (proposing the use of a Bayesian model as a means of 
“clarify[ing]” evidentiary rules that “involve weighing evidence in an 
essentially probabilistic fashion”). 
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rulings on unsettled questions by revealing the hidden intuitions that 
underlie judicial behavior.45 Similarly, they may help us teach rules to 
new lawyers in a way that integrates each rule into a larger, coherent 
pattern, facilitating both learning and future recall.46 And finally, 
doctrinal theories may be especially valuable when placed side by side 
with well-specified descriptive or normative models. When a good 
doctrinal model differs from a good descriptive model, it suggests that 
judges have a faulty understanding of how fact finders actually 
process evidence. Conversely, if a doctrinal model fails to line up with 
a normative model, it suggests an area in which there is a need for 
judicial education or rule reform.  
As should be clear from the discussion above, it is quite possible 
that multiple models, even if dramatically different in their structures, 
could be useful for those who would attempt to understand or 
improve the law of evidence.47 Indeed, it would be an astonishing 
coincidence if the best version of all three models was identical in its 
particulars because that would mean that the way that jurors actually 
reason is both perfectly captured by judicial intuitions about proof 
and normatively ideal. Since the real world is not likely to be such a 
rosy place, we will best be able to optimize evidentiary rules and 
practices only if we are careful to distinguish between descriptive, 
normative, and doctrinal models of inference.48  
B. A Brief Taxonomy of Fact-Finding Models 
Having set forth the goals of the enterprise, it is now time to 
explore the lay of the land. Perhaps the easiest way to chart the 
existing literature on fact-finding models is in terms of one mighty 
power arrayed against a group of loosely allied enemies. The mighty 
power is the Bayesian framework, which has been developed in 
exquisite detail during its nearly fifty years of active use. The allied 
enemies are the family of theories I have somewhat carelessly lumped 
 
45. Cf. Tillers, supra note 39, at 172 (noting the value of predicting future 
behavior in litigation). 
46. See Lempert, supra note 39, at 447 (discussing the success of Bayes’ rule 
as a tool for teaching the concept of relevance to students). 
47. Cf. Simon, supra note 5, at 561–62, 561 n.168 (noting that many 
advocates of existing models attempt to deploy them simultaneously to 
serve normative and descriptive functions). 
48. See id. at 561–68 (suggesting that a holistic model functions well as a 
descriptive account of fact-finding, but for that very reason generates 
poor normative recommendations for constraining prejudicial influences 
on the jury); see also Koehler, Chia & Lindsey, supra note 41, at 210–16 
(showing a disjunction between the evidential force of certain 
information about DNA testing as estimated by a normative Bayesian 
model and as estimated by a population of mock jurors in an research 
setting, and using that disjunction as support for suggested law 
reforms). 
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together as “story-comparison” frameworks. These theories do overlap 
in various respects, but perhaps the clearest commonality is their 
united objection to some or all of the assumptions of Bayesianism. 
For this reason, the landscape can be most easily understood if we 
start with the first approach and then explicate the others by 
comparison and contrast. 
1. The Bayesian Model 
The Bayesian approach starts with a simple method—drawn from 
probability theory—for describing the varying confidence levels a fact 
finder might have regarding the probative force of a piece of evidence. 
Probability theory offers a way to describe the likelihood of uncertain 
events, by grading them on a scale that runs from 0 to 1.49 In the 
evidentiary context, we can use these probabilities to represent the 
varying levels of subjective confidence a person might have regarding 
a belief.50 Thus, the Bayesian strain of probability theory invites us to 
imagine a thermometer51 of belief, which runs from 0, representing 
total disbelief in a proposition, through 0.5, representing maximal 
uncertainty, up to 1, representing total belief. We can then start to 
consider the effect of new items of evidence on existing confidence 
levels, asking whether the new evidence makes the existing belief 
stronger or weaker.52 Thus, we might say that hearing eyewitness 
testimony placing a suspect at the scene of a crime moves us to 
change our degree of belief in his guilt from 0.6 to 0.9. This means 
that our internal feeling of confidence in the proposition has moved 
from “I think he did it, but I’m far from certain of it” to “I am quite 
confident that he is guilty.”  
The real power of the Bayesian approach is that we can 
repeatedly apply this updating process, allowing us to describe the 
process by which a fact finder considers multiple items of evidence 
before arriving at a verdict.53 For example, consider the testimony of 
 
49. Pardo, supra note 39, at 575 (“[P]robability assessments fall somewhere 
on a scale between 1 (which equals certain truth) and 0 (which equals 
certain falsity) . . . .”).  
50. Cf. Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 24 (contrasting aleatory 
probabilities that “rest entirely on counting operations involving a finite 
collection of possible game outcomes, all of which are assumed to be 
equally probable[ ],” and epistemic probabilities, which express a 
person’s subjective belief that a certain event will occur). 
51. See 6 Jeremy Bentham, Works of Jeremy Bentham 225 (London, 
Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., 1843) (developing the metaphor of the 
“thermometer of persuasion”). 
52. Terence Anderson, David Schum & William Twining, Analysis 
of Evidence 251 (2d ed. 2005). 
53. See Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 127–31 (“Bayes’ rule also 
requires us to take account of a variety of interesting evidential 
interactions. By an interaction we mean that the evidence is 
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one jailhouse informant in the Rivera case, David Crespo, who 
testified that Rivera confessed to the killing one day after a Bible 
study class that the two attended in jail.54 Illustrated below, Bayes’ 
rule provides a way to describe the force that this evidence would 
have for a juror whose beliefs followed standard rules for combining 
probabilities.55 
 
P(G) * P(e|G)
P(G|e) = _________
 
    P (e) 
This equation tells us how to determine the degree of confidence 
that our juror should have in Rivera’s guilt, G, after hearing this new 
piece of evidence, e, which we label as the “probability of G given e,” 
or P(G|e). In order to determine this quantity using Bayes’ rule, we 
combine (1) the juror’s prior confidence in guilt before hearing the 
new evidence, P(G); (2) the hypothetical level of confidence the juror 
would have that Crespo’s testimony was true assuming that Rivera 
was guilty, P(e|G); and (3) the degree to which the juror is convinced 
that Rivera really did confess to Crespo, P(e). So a juror’s change in 
belief based on Crespo’s testimony can be predicted based solely on 
three pieces of information: the previous strength of the juror’s belief 
in Rivera’s guilt, the strength of the juror’s belief in the truth of 
Crespo’s testimony, and the degree to which the juror believes that 
Crespo’s testimony would be likely to arise given the assumption that 
Rivera was actually guilty. 
Many early Bayesian models imagined the inferential process as a 
repeated series of these calculations. In John Kaplan’s seminal paper, 
the model started with prior odds of guilt and then—by deciding how 
likely it would be to encounter that piece of evidence given either a 
hypothesis of innocence or a hypothesis of guilt—repeatedly adjusted 
those odds based on each new piece of evidence that was received 
using Bayes’ rule.56 This model has the advantage of structural 
 
nonindependent in various ways. What this means is that knowledge of 
one item of evidence may influence our judgment of the probative force 
of another.”). 
54. People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).  
55. See Schum, supra note 38, at 215 (explaining posterior and prior 
probability measures as a way to measure the probability that some 
hypothesis of interest, H, changes after additional evidence, E*, is 
introduced). 
56. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1084–85 (“Beginning with what he believes 
to be Ω0, the initial likelihood of the defendant's guilt, the decision 
theorist will examine the first piece of evidence and determine as best he 
can the value of L—the ratio of the probability that the piece of 
evidence would have occurred under the hypothesis of guilt to the 
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simplicity, even if quantifying the appropriate likelihood ratio for each 
new piece of evidence may be a subtle and difficult task.57  
Lawrence Tribe vigorously attacked this account of fact-finding 
inference and pointed out that this simple version of the model 
assumes the conditional independence of the inferences based on 
individual items of evidence.58 In lay language, this means that the 
model relied on an assumption that the force of earlier pieces of 
evidence is unaffected by subsequently received evidence. As Tribe 
urged, this is often false with respect to real cases. He offered the 
example of an armed robbery case in which the break-in took place 
between 3:00 a.m. and 3:30 a.m. and would have required at least 
fifteen minutes to accomplish.59 Evidence placing the defendant in his 
car a half mile from the scene of the crime at 3:10 a.m. on the night 
in question might increase the odds of guilt. Similarly, evidence that 
he was driving in his car a half-mile from crime scene at 3:20 a.m., if 
evaluated on its own, might have similar force. But the two pieces of 
evidence, taken together, are exculpatory given the time required to 
commit the crime.60  
Based on arguments like this, some modern Bayesians prefer to 
frame their models in networked terms rather than linear.61 To deal 
with potential interdependencies among items of evidence, Bayes’ rule 
requires us to consider the likelihood of observing a piece of evidence 
not only given the overall hypotheses of guilt or innocence offered by 
either party but also given each preceding piece of evidence seen in 
the case.62 A natural way of addressing these interdependencies is to 
 
probability that it would have occurred under the hypothesis of 
innocence. He will then calculate Ω1. Similarly, he will find Ω2—the 
likelihood of the defendant's guilt after the consideration of the second 
piece of evidence and before the consideration of the third piece—by 
considering the equation Ω2 = L2 (Ω1).”). 
57. Among other considerations, each likelihood ratio depends significantly 
on the many judgments that coalesce into our assessments of a witness’s 
credibility. See id. at 1088–91 (describing how to write an equation that 
incorporates all requisite potential probabilities for determining a 
witness’s credibility). 
58. Tribe, supra note 36 at 1367–68, 1368 n.126.  
59. Id. at 1367. 
60. Id. 
61. See, e.g., Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 242–48, 266–67 
(discussing the use of inference networks for complex probabilistic 
analyses); Tod S. Levitt & Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, Computational 
Inference for Evidential Reasoning in Support of Judicial Proof, 
22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1691, 1692 (2001) (“We use Bayesian networks 
(‘BNs’) to capture the structure of arguments and to provide a 
numerical representation of their strength.” (footnote omitted)). 
62. See Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 127–31. 
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switch from a linear to a networked model, in which individual 
evidence items contribute to a final verdict decision only through 
their contributions to numerous intervening hypotheses about the 
factual events under dispute. Thus, one interesting way of 
implementing Bayesian analysis into an account of proof is to chart 
the relations between individual pieces of evidence, a variety of 
intermediate hypotheses of interest to a decision maker, and the final 
“facts of consequence” that will determine the outcome of a trial.63 
Such “Bayesian networks” can then output a single value, which is 
the likelihood that a party is guilty or innocent of a charged crime.64 
This complex web of inferential connections allows the model to 
address the connections between pieces of evidence at a granular level 
and then slowly build up toward the primary facts of interest in the 
litigation. This is not the only way to address interdependencies 
among evidence items—one could also address them sequentially, 
computing the likelihood ratio for each new piece of evidence in light 
of its interactions with all of the prior evidence items65—but the 
networked approach allows us to visualize those interdependencies. 
2. Bayesianism’s Rivals: Stories, Comparisons, and Coherence 
Having described the Bayesian approach to modeling trial 
inference, let us consider the alternative approaches. Perhaps the most 
prominent alternative account is the “Story Model,” developed by 
Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie to explain the results of a variety 
of mock-jury experiments. These authors argued that jurors do not 
 
63. See id. at 133–50 (combining Bayesian-probability computations with a 
Wigmorean-chart structure to better facilitate the separation of 
independent and nonindependent evidence items); see also Judea 
Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference 13–21 
(2000) (discussing Bayesian Networks). 
64. See Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 195. Joseph Kadane, David 
Schum, and David Kaiser employed a Bayesian-network model of the 
major inferences present in the famous trial of Nicola Sacco and 
Bartolomeo Vanzetti, Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 
1926), and then computed the likelihood that Sacco was guilty based on 
a Bayesian combination of the inferences, which were laid out in a 
chart, by multiplying likelihood ratios along the graph’s edges. Id. at 
193–98. This effort produced twenty-eight charts depicting differing 
subsets of the hundreds of units comprising the larger inference network. 
See id. at 89–115. Nevertheless, the final product was, as the authors 
acknowledged, substantially simplified compared to the task facing the 
actual jury. See id. at 281 (“[T]he twelve jurors actually saw and heard 
all the trial evidence; we can only read verbal accounts of it in the trial 
transcript . . . . [Furthermore,] the [identified] chains of reasoning 
resulted from . . . our own imaginative reasoning . . . . [and] are not the 
only ones that may be reasonable or plausible.”). 
65. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical 
Challenge, 1 Int’l J. Evid. & Proof 276, 287 (1996). 
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compute the probabilistic force of individual pieces of evidence but 
instead construct mental narratives that organize and explain the 
received evidence.66 When mock jurors are asked to speak aloud while 
trying to determine what verdict fits the evidence, their reasoning 
tends to invoke “story structures” rather than other plausible 
structures.67 According to Pennington and Hastie, these constructed 
stories guide the interpretation of subsequent ambiguities in the 
evidence, and jurors were more likely to select a particular verdict 
when the evidence supporting that verdict was presented in a fashion 
that facilitated the construction of a favorable story.68 The authors 
then showed in a subsequent paper that when jurors are asked to 
provide probability estimates for individual aspects of cases, a 
Bayesian combination of these individual probabilities performs poorly 
as a predictor of their final decisions.69 
Although in their early work they focused on the ways that 
constructing a single story shaped a juror’s verdicts, Pennington and 
Hastie later incorporated the idea of story comparison into their 
theory. They maintained that jurors construct “one or more” 
plausible accounts of the disputed events and then choose the most 
acceptable story from among the generated set to guide their 
subsequent reasoning.70 In cases where more than one story is under 
consideration, they posited that jurors would rely on three principles 
when choosing between alternatives.71 First, jurors would tend to 
prefer stories with better “coverage,” meaning those that accounted 
for a greater share of trial evidence than alternatives.72 Second, jurors 
would prefer more “coherent” stories, meaning those that were free of 
internal contradictions, free of problematic gaps, and plausible based 
on the juror’s knowledge of “real or imagined events in the real 
 
66. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 189. 
67. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex 
Decision Making, 51 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 242, 252–53 
(1986). 
68. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision 
Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 
14 J. Experimental Psychol. Learning Memory & Cognition 
521, 528–30 (1988) (“Subjects were more than twice as likely to find 
the defendant guilty of murder in our stimulus case when prosecution 
evidence was ordered in story form and defense evidence was not, 
compared to when defense evidence was presented in story form and 
prosecution evidence was not.”). 
69. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 199. 
70. Id. at 190. 
71. Id. at 190–91. 
72.  Id. at 190. 
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world.”73 In some cases, the authors suggested that one story would 
clearly dominate the alternatives based on these criteria and would be 
chosen by the fact finder for the purpose of further decision making in 
the case. In other cases, by contrast, both sides will offer accounts 
that are internally coherent and have strong connections to the 
evidence presented. In such cases, stories “will lack uniqueness, and 
great uncertainty will result.”74 
Others have argued for the priority of comparative frameworks 
over Bayesian models for quite different reasons. Jonathan Cohen 
objected not to the use of probabilities in an inferential model but to 
the kind of probabilities that Bayesian models employ.75 It was a 
mistake to build an inferential theory using cardinal probabilities, he 
urged, because they failed to account for the idea of evidential 
weight.76 In Cohen’s view, we should grade the strength of an 
uncertain inference of fact not merely on the degree to which we 
currently accept it as true but also on the amount of evidence we had 
accumulated when evaluating the question.77 Thus, we might think 
that something is probably true but also know that there was a good 
chance that our opinion might change in the future, given that we 
had examined only a small subset of available evidence. Cohen urged 
that instead of quantifying uncertain beliefs by reference to a fixed 
scale with identifiable endpoints, we should instead analyze uncertain 
beliefs ordinally, limiting ourselves to ranking competing beliefs in 
comparative terms based on the quantity of particularized evidence 
that supports either view.78 
One driver of Cohen’s discomfort with the Bayesian approach was 
his worry that, if taken as a normative model, it recommended 
outcomes that ill accord with common-sense intuitions about proof 
when applied to certain hypothetical cases. A point of particular 
concern involved cases in which proof of liability or guilt was founded 
on statistical, rather than particularized, forms of evidence.79 Cohen 
developed the “Gatecrasher Hypothetical” to illustrate this concern. 
In this stylized example, 499 people paid for admission to a rodeo, but 
 
73.  Id. at 191. 
74. Id. 
75. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 121 (arguing that conventional features of 
judicial proof are incompatible with Pascalian probabilities and 
suggesting that an inductive conception would fare better). 
76. See id. at 36–39 (borrowing the concept of evidential weight from John 
Maynard Keynes but arguing that it should assume a more central place 
in evidential theory than Keynes assigned it (citing John Maynard 
Keynes, A Treatise on Probability 71 (1957))). 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at 40–41. 
79. Id. at 74–81.  
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1000 people were seated on the night of the show. No tickets were 
issued, and we will assume that a particular attendee, Andrew, is 
unable to testify regarding his purchase of a ticket. This implies, in a 
probabilistic framework, that there is a 0.501 probability that Andrew 
is a gatecrasher.80 But to Cohen and numerous others in the 
comparative-evaluation camp, it seems “manifestly unjust” to allow 
the rodeo to recover its ticket price from Andrew on the basis of such 
proof alone, given that we would have observed the same evidence if 
Andrew was actually a member of the ticket-paying minority.81 
Cohen’s solution to the paradox invoked his own inductive 
probabilities. Purely statistical evidence, he argued, failed to provide 
any inductive support to the idea that Andrew was a gatecrasher; as 
a result, the plaintiff had no more evidence supporting his case than 
the defendant had supporting his own, resulting in a verdict for the 
defense.82 Some courts have reasoned similarly, distrusting the idea of 
purely statistical proof and insisting that there be a basis on which a 
fact finder can “actually believe” that a defendant is liable, rather 
than merely thinking it statistically more likely than the alternative.83  
More recently, Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen offered another 
comparative account of proof as an alternative to Bayesianism, which 
they labeled “inference to the best explanation” or “abduction.”84 In 
their theory, fact-finding consists of the construction and comparison 
of two (or more) differing hypothetical accounts of the events giving 
rise to the dispute under trial. A fact finder, after hearing the 
evidence, evaluates which of the parties’ stories better explains the 
evidence they have heard, and then determines which story better 
explains the given pattern of evidence.85 In a civil case, the party with 
the stronger story will prevail, whereas in a criminal case, the defense 
can prevail even with a weaker story so long as its story is 
“plausible.”86 In this framing, fact-finding looks like a tournament 
 
80. Id. at 75. 
81. Id.  
82. See id. at 271 (describing how courts, by requiring evidence to be 
“specifically against” a particular defendant, as opposed to generalized, 
help prevent injustices attributable to the standard of proof); see also 
discussion infra Part IV.  
83. Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940); see 
also Nesson, supra note 36, at 1358–59 (stating that the goal of the fact-
finding process is to generate “acceptable verdicts,” not “mathematically 
probable verdicts”). 
84. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 223–26 (introducing their 
explanation-based account of judicial proof); see also Josephson, supra 
note 3, at 1621–22 (distinguishing among the primary meanings of 
“abduction”).  
85. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234–35. 
86. Id. at 234–39. 
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between alternative explanations rather than an archeological 
reconstruction of the probable truth. By choosing the last story 
standing without demanding that it be probably true, abductionists 
believe they can avoid some difficulties faced by Bayesian 
frameworks.87 
Finally, a few authors have articulated another possible 
alternative to the Bayesian approach, based on the concept of 
coherence networks. Such networks are loosely modeled on the ways 
that neurons interact within the brain. They are connectionist in 
structure: they incorporate a number of units, which can be activated 
to varying extents, and connections between those units, which allow 
activation in one unit to amplify or inhibit activation in other linked 
units.88 Over time, activation levels will propagate across such 
networks until stable recurring patterns of activation are reached. If 
we think of the units as representing various beliefs that a juror could 
have about a case and the connections as embodying intuitive 
judgments of the degree to which those beliefs are coherent with each 
other, then this process can be used to simulate the process of 
choosing one set of mutually supporting facts about a case while 
rejecting a set of inconsistent facts.89  
Proponents of these new connectionist inference models generally 
maintain that they are largely consistent with other work in the 
comparative tradition but are, for varying reasons, inconsistent with 
 
87. For instance, Allen and Pardo believe that their account avoids the 
conjunction paradox and reference-class problem. See id., at 253, 259–
60. But see Edward K. Cheng, Essay, A Practical Solution to the 
Reference Class Problem, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 2081, 2084 (2009) 
(suggesting that there may be principled ways to choose among 
reference classes); Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the 
Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1567–75 (2001) 
(arguing that the conjunction problem may be more apparent than 
real). See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The 
Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. Legal 
Stud. 107, 111–14 (2007) (describing the reference-class concern); 
Nesson, supra note 36, at 1385–86 (describing the conjunction paradox). 
88. See Simon, supra note 5, at 520–21; Paul Thagard, Causal Inference in 
Legal Decision Making: Explanatory Coherence vs. Bayesian Networks, 
18 Applied Artificial Intelligence 231, 235 (2004) [hereinafter 
Thagard’s Causal Inference]; Thagard, supra note 26, at 362–67. See 
generally William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism 
and the Mind: An Introduction to Parallel Processing in 
Networks 1–65 (1991) (contrasting networks and symbol systems as 
two approaches to modeling cognition and then introducing a third 
approach involving connectionist architecture). For further discussion 
and application see infra Part III.A. 
89. See, e.g., Thagard’s Causal Inference, supra note 88, at 237–39 
(describing the use of such a network to analyze the competing 
inferences in the von Bulow trial). 
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formal Bayesian accounts of proof.90 But despite these claims, the 
connectionist approach also differs in significant ways from the other 
anti-Bayesian models that I have described. First, coherence networks 
do not isolate and compare specific explanatory accounts but instead 
analyze all the evidence items simultaneously. Second, coherence 
networks can accommodate and describe some aspects of fact-finding 
cognition that prior models cannot. Dan Simon used a coherence 
model to explain the tendency of mock jurors to respond to new items 
of seemingly incriminating evidence by inflating their assessments of 
the probative force of other, entirely unrelated evidence against that 
party. Such “coherence shifts” lie mostly outside the awareness of the 
jurors themselves and seem to add problematic and irrational aspects 
to the fact-finding process.91 Likewise, Paul Thagard has used such 
models to illustrate how an emotional preference for one conclusion 
over another might interact with evidentiary strength, using the O.J. 
Simpson case as an example.92 Although the utility of connectionist 
models is to date little explored in the evidence literature, it is a 
promising new direction on which I hope to build in this Article.93 
Thus, there remains a hotly contested division between Bayesians 
and proponents of competing alternatives. The Bayesian approach, on 
the one hand, provides a simple formalization of uncertainty and 
characterizes the process of fact-finding in terms of repeated revisions 
of internal probability estimations based on each new item of 
evidence. The competing models, by contrast, mostly converge on the 
idea that evidential evaluation is holistic rather than atomistic; that it 
requires the consideration of particularized explanatory narratives, 
not just mere statistical likelihoods; and that narratives can and 
should be evaluated by comparison with one another rather than in 
terms of their absolute force.  
C. What the Existing Discussion Has Taken for Granted 
Having explored the contrast between these two approaches, it is 
worth stepping back a bit and seeing some of their commonalities. 
When one surveys this literature, two common assumptions seem 
 
90. See e.g., Simon, supra note 5, at 562 (suggesting that the global 
coherence shifts exhibited by such models are inconsistent with the 
atomistic, piece-by-piece assessments of probative force required in a 
Bayesian model); Thagard’s Causal Inference, supra note 88, at 242–43 
(suggesting that the coherence network is more intuitively plausible 
because Bayesian networks require the specification of a large number of 
obscure and unintuitive probabilities, which is not a feature that one 
observes introspectively when considering the inferential force of 
evidence). 
91. Simon, supra note 5, at 547.  
92. See Thagard, supra note 26, at 372–75. 
93. See discussion infra Part III. 
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widespread. The first assumption is that fact-finding is largely an 
explicit process that is accessible to introspective analysis. Thus, when 
we speak of probabilities in a descriptive Bayesian model, the usual 
assumption seems to be that these represent the explicit beliefs held 
by fact finders.94 Likewise, when Pennington and Hastie criticized the 
Bayesian model for lacking descriptive realism, they focused on 
conscious reasoning processes almost exclusively. To demonstrate that 
juror decisions are poorly predicted by Bayes’ rule, they relied on 
mock jurors’ self-reported probabilistic estimates of the strength of 
various trial inferences.95 Similarly, when they wished to suggest that 
story construction played a more important role, they relied on the 
thoughts that mock jurors reported aloud while deliberating about a 
case.96  
The second assumption is that evidential reasoning is best 
modeled in ways that largely correspond with our common-sense 
assumptions about the reasonable force of various kinds of proof. 
Although this assumption is rarely defended explicitly, it forms the 
bedrock of the standard set of approaches to answering questions in 
this field. Neither the Bayesian probabilistic framework nor the 
various comparative approaches provide much of a basis for 
explaining why judges and jurors sometimes act in ways that seem 
unreasonable when analyzed from a reflective distance. The two 
primary exceptions to this trend have been the connectionist models 
recently deployed by Simon and Thagard,97 but these authors’ 
attempts to incorporate motivated cognition and emotional bias into 
models of the fact-finding process have had distressingly little impact 
on the continuing debates between Bayesians and Bayesioskeptics.  
Of course, to the extent that these models are used normatively, 
as a means of recommending best practices rather than describing 
what judges and juries are likely to do in real cases, we are unlikely to 
be troubled by either of the above assumptions. It would be difficult, 
after all, to imagine a useful way of identifying ideal inference 
processes without making those processes both explicit and reliant on 
defensible inferential arguments. But even if these two assumptions 
are virtues when applied normatively, they limit the reach of our 
theorizing when applied in a descriptive context. First, it seems to be 
 
94. See, e.g., Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that they used 
subjective, or “epistemic,” probabilities as the basis of their analysis of 
the Sacco and Vanzetti case); Nance, supra note 87, at 1600–06 
(characterizing Bayesian models as consistency constraints on the 
subjective probability estimates of fact finders).  
95. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 197–201 (describing an 
experiment designed to test the Story Model). 
96. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 67, at 245–46. 
97. Simon, supra note 5, at 520–49; Thagard, supra note 26, at 372–76.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding 
154 
an incontrovertible fact that judges and juries sometimes act 
indefensibly.98 But unless we employ accounts of fact-finding that 
explain such behavior, any rule-reform suggestions we might make 
based upon our models will be ill equipped to deal with our most 
problematic cases. Second, as I discuss below, an ever-larger body of 
research suggests that a substantial component of real-world 
judgments and inferences are derived from an unconscious system of 
reasoning that does not obey the common-sense rules of explicit 
reasoning. It is my hope that by incorporating this hidden structure of 
thought into our conception of fact-finding behavior, we can also 
make headway toward understanding why judges and juries 
sometimes act in ways that seem to defy reflective common sense. 
II. A Primer on Dual-Process Cognition 
In recent years, research programs in psychology and neuroscience 
have produced a consistent pattern of results, suggesting that our 
minds can process information in two dramatically different ways.99 
On some tasks, answers come quickly, effortlessly, and automatically, 
while at other times, we consciously experience a slow, effortful 
process of reasoning to a conclusion.100 Increasingly, researchers have 
come to identify these differences as indicative of two different modes 
of reasoning and judgment, working side by side in our minds. 
Sometimes these modes work collaboratively, but other times they 
conflict with each other. Many psychologists refer to these two modes 
of processing as “System 1” and “System 2,”101 and I will follow that 
 
98. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 55–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) 
(describing a jury conviction after the presentation of highly exculpatory 
evidence); Griffin, supra note 3, at 282–85 (discussing the unsettling 
case of State v. Jensen, 794 N.W.2d 482, 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010), in 
which a jury convicted a man of murdering his wife despite a number of 
facts suggesting that it could have been a suicide); see also Susan L. 
Gellis, Reasons for Case Reversal in Texas: An Analysis, 16 St. 
Mary’s L.J. 299, 307, 318 (1985) (finding, in a sample of Texas 
appellate decisions, that a substantial fraction of reversals were based on 
the appellate court’s conclusion that there had been insufficient 
evidence, or no evidence at all, supporting the jury’s verdict). 
99. See, e.g., Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of 
Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 
255, 256–58 (2008); Frankish & Evans, supra note 29, at 1; Keith E. 
Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: 
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 Behav. & Brain Sci. 645, 
658–59 (2000). 
100. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 19–21. 
101. See, e.g., id.; Peter Carruthers, An Architecture for Dual Reasoning, in 
Two Minds, supra note 29, at 109, 109–12; Keith Frankish, Systems 
and Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal-Subpersonal 
Distinction, in Two Minds, supra note 29, at 89, 96–102 (2009); see 
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convention in this Article. Others are wary of the metaphor of 
structurally distinct systems and prefer to think of the two modes of 
processing as a family of “Type 1” processes, which share many 
important features, and a family of “Type 2” processes, which do not 
share the features of the “Type 1” family.102  
At the outset, it is important to be as clear as possible about 
what, precisely, we are claiming when we describe cognition as 
involving two systems or processes. We need not think that a two-
system mind uses two physically separable brain structures; rather, 
these terms merely denote two categories of mental processes that can 
be usefully separated because the individual processes share certain 
common features.103 To say that we have dual-system minds is to say 
that the ways in which we learn, encode, and use knowledge when 
solving problems can take two very different forms and that, at times, 
these differing processes can produce conflicting outputs.104 In this 
section, I will outline the terrains in which these two systems operate, 
their unique methods of processing information, and the ways that 
they interact with each other. 
 
also Jonathan St.B. T. Evans & David E. Over, Rationality 
and Reasoning 141 (1996) (providing an early use of the “dual 
systems” terminology); Frankish & Evans, supra note 29, at 15 (tracing 
the origin of the “System 1/System 2” locution to Keith E. Stanovich 
(citing Keith E. Stanovich, Who Is Rational?: Studies of 
Individual Differences in Reasoning (1999))). 
102. See, e.g., Stanovich, supra note 28, at 18–19 (explaining his preference 
for a Type 1/Type 2 terminology to capture a “dual-process theory” as 
opposed to a “dual-system theory”); Evans, supra note 99, at 270–71 
(“We might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes since 
all theories seem to contrast fast, automatic, or unconscious processes 
with those that are slow, effortful, and conscious.”). Some theorists 
further complicate the account by bifurcating System 2 into multiple 
systems. For instance, Stanovich recently proposed a tri-partite model, 
which maintains the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes 
while further subdividing the latter category into algorithmic and 
reflective processes. Stanovich, supra, note 28, at 25–26. But these 
refinements of the model’s terminology should not distract from the 
basic, widely shared insights that (1) there is more than one type of 
mental processing and (2) at least one important analytic cleavage is 
captured by the dichotomy between Type 1 processes and other styles of 
processing. Id. at 33 (quoting Daniel T. Gilbert, What the Mind’s Not, 
in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology 3, 3–4 (Shelly 
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)). 
103. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 28–29 (explaining that System 1 and 
System 2 are “fictional characters” used for explanatory purposes). 
104. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 16–17, 19–22. 
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A. System 1 Is a Hidden, Unconscious Information Processor 
System 1 processing is implicit rather than explicit. This means 
that the work it does occurs outside conscious awareness, so that we 
are aware of our conclusions but not the process that produced 
them.105 For some, this may come as a startling suggestion; “how,” 
you might wonder, “can I think about something without knowing 
that I am thinking?” But reflection shows that we are actually 
unaware of most of our own cognition. Take, as a simple example, the 
act of driving to work on a typical, uneventful morning.106 Over every 
second of our journey, we are performing a simply astonishing 
quantity of computation. Reflected light enters our eyes in a jumble 
of sensation, and we process it extensively to form a model of the 
world around us, in which objects are distinct from one another and 
related to one another in a three-dimensional spatial model. 
Additionally, we are automatically sorting objects in this model so 
that we give prioritized attention to signals that relate to the task at 
hand. We mostly do not notice the trees and the businesses that line 
the side of the road, the details of the cars surrounding us, or the 
clouds in the sky, but we respond to traffic signals or brake lights 
with automatic ease.107 When we wish to move our vehicle in a 
particular direction, we must move our hands and feet in precise 
sequences to manipulate vehicular controls, but we do not have to 
think about what we will do before we do it.  
Sometimes, we can infer that System 1 is at work just based on 
the fact that we can perform some mental tasks without felt effort or 
focused awareness; thus, when we drive a car without thinking about 
it, we know that some unconscious mental activity must be doing the 
heavy lifting.108 But System 1 does not only step up to the plate when 
 
105. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 17–41 (2002) (describing the multitude 
of roles performed by implicit System 1 processes, which he collectively 
labels the “adaptive unconscious”); Ron Sun et al., The Two Systems of 
Learning: An Architectural Perspective, in Two Minds, supra note 29, 
239, 239–42 (discussing the distinction between implicit and explicit 
learning and knowledge). 
106. Kahneman, supra note 28, at 29. 
107. Id. at 21–22 (noting that System 1 processes can, with effortless ease, 
direct our attention where it is needed from moment to moment). 
108. With a little introspection, we can identify many other situations where 
we perform impressive computational feats with little to no conscious 
attention. Other examples include walking down a crowded street, 
recognizing familiar faces, performing routine tasks like getting dressed, 
and understanding the meaning of sentences written in a familiar 
language. When we feel an impulse to walk, we just move from point A 
to point B without thinking about our balance or the need to avoid 
obstacles. Likewise, when we see a simple sentence written in our native 
language, we usually know what it means rapidly and without conscious 
analysis. See id.  
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we stop paying attention; it is constantly working in the background 
of our minds and shaping the way we think even when we are 
consciously attending to a particular task.109 So to study the nature of 
this hidden but pervasive form of mental processing, it is necessary to 
measure how people process information that they are unaware of or 
that they think is irrelevant to the task at hand. 
An extensive literature has sprung up that does exactly this, 
showing that people’s decisions are regularly impacted to a significant 
extent by factors that they do not consciously perceive.110 Some of the 
clearest examples of such implicit cognition involve people with brain 
disorders. For example, people with blindsight are unable to perceive 
certain regions of their visual field consciously. If you display objects 
to them so that they are only visible in the blinded part of their 
vision and then ask them what they saw, they will reply that they 
have no idea. But if you let them try to pick the objects out of a 
larger group, they will choose the right ones at levels well above 
random chance, all the while asserting that their choice was a mere 
guess.111 Nor are such phenomena limited to people with brain 
disorders; when ordinary people view words that have been flashed on 
a screen too quickly to be noticed consciously, they will change their 
behavior in response to the subliminal cue without realizing that it 
even occurred.112 Our eyes take in, and our brains interpret, more 
information than we ever consciously perceive. 
What is perhaps most striking about this automatic and implicit 
processing is the extent to which it goes on, without our awareness, 
even regarding stimuli that we are processing consciously in different 
ways. As we encounter objects, words, or concepts in our daily lives, 
features of these objects will affect our subsequent behavior even 
when we are not aware of any connection. A full catalogue of such 
effects is impossible, but a few examples may illustrate the point: 
 When evaluating ambiguous vignettes, people were more 
likely to see immoral behavior in those vignettes if they had 
 
109. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 14, 40–41 (describing the extent to which 
unconscious associative processes mediate nearly all significant human 
activities—including learning, evaluation, and goal-setting). 
110. See id. at 44–48 (noting that even what we perceive as consciously 
determined choices can be the product of prior unconscious cognition). 
111. Daniel L. Schacter, Implicit Knowledge: New Perspectives on 
Unconscious Processes, 89 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 11113, 
11113–15 (1992). 
112. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 30–31 (describing an experiment in which 
participants, after being primed with extremely short displays of words 
like “hostile,” “insult,” and “unkind,” subsequently interpreted other 
people’s behavior in more negative ways than did a control group, even 
though they did not report any awareness they had seen the words). 
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recently been exposed to unrelated disgusting stimuli. Thus, 
bad smells, a disorderly room, and being asked to recall 
disgusting experiences all made it more likely that people 
would view particular behavior as immoral.113 
 When subjects are asked to evaluate a speaker’s credibility, 
they will inflate their ratings of that speaker’s honesty if the 
speaker is attractive.114 Similarly, when research 
participants were asked to monitor the competence of 
workers who were performing a maze-solving task, they 
generally believed that the more attractive workers were 
better at solving the maze, even though they were not.115 
 People who have been primed with images of money become 
more independent and less helpful. They are less likely to 
ask for help on difficult tasks and less likely to provide help 
when others request it. They even choose to sit farther 
away from other people than people who were not similarly 
primed.116  
As these examples show, unconscious cognitive processing extends 
well beyond the domain of behaviors we think of as habitual or 
automatic. Rather, implicit System 1 processing plays a role in 
determining our beliefs and actions even in the domains we ordinarily 
think of as embodying rational or moral behavior.  
B. The Associative Structure of System 1 Unconscious Thinking 
Having explored one means of differentiating System 1 from 
System 2 processes—the fact that System 1 processes occur outside of 
our conscious awareness—let us now consider a second point 
differentiation: the associative structure of System 1 thinking. 
System 1 processes seem to do much of their work by sensing familiar 
patterns in sensory data and assimilating those patterns to known 
concepts, forming an unconscious associative network.117 Sometimes, 
 
113. Simone Schnall et al., Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment, 
34 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1096, 1097–104 (2008). 
114. Marc-André Reinhard & Siegfried L. Sporer, Content Versus Source Cue 
Information as a Basis for Credibility Judgments: The Impact of Task 
Involvement, 41 Soc. Psychol. 93, 95–97 (2010). 
115. Markus M. Mobius & Tanya S. Rosenblat, Why Beauty Matters, 96 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 222, 228–34 (2006). 
116. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 
314 Science 1154, 1154–56 (2006). 
117. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 50–58 (providing examples of priming 
and the “complex constellation of responses [that can] occur[ ] quickly, 
automatically, and effortlessly” as a result of System 1 processes); 
Wilson, supra note 28, at 24–27 (discussing “the adaptive unconscious 
as the pattern detector”); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for 
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activating these concepts directly prompts us to action. At other 
times, the activation of one mental pattern or concept may spread, 
without our knowledge, to other related concepts, which then affect 
our subsequent behavior.118 The common thread that ties these 
influences together lies in System 1’s ability to automatically form 
connections between stimuli that tend to occur together, which it uses 
to guide our behavior when those stimuli reoccur. System 1, in other 
words, learns by association and uses associative connections between 
unconsciously represented concepts to prime us toward beliefs, 
decisions, and actions that have been associated with similar stimuli 
in the past.119 
First, let us explore the idea that a fundamental aspect of 
System 1 cognition involves assimilating sensory information to 
familiar patterns. We are all familiar with one dramatic example of 
System 1’s associative power, which is the effortless ease with which 
we can recognize the faces of people we know even under poor viewing 
conditions.120 As an example, gaze for a minute at Figure 1. 
 
 
Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 Psychol. Bull. 3, 4 (1996); Eliot R. 
Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive 
Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory 
Systems, 4 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 108, 111 (2000). But 
see Evans, supra note 99, at 261 (doubting that some versions of the 
dual-process framework, such as the heuristic/systematic processing 
account, can be reconciled with associationism). For further discussion 
of associative networks and modeling see infra Part II.B. 
118. See Timothy P. McNamara, Theories of Priming: II. Types of Primes, 
20 J. Experimental Psychol.: Learning Memory & Cognition 
507, 514–16 (1994) (providing evidence that priming effects can exhibit 
spreading activation patterns). 
119. Smith & DeCoster, supra note 117, at 113–14. 
120. See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Authors’ Response, 
Advancing the Rationality Debate, 23 Behav. & Brain Sci. 701, 715 
(2000) (including face-detection on a list of routine System 1 cognitive 
tasks). 
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FIGURE 1: A field of shaded squares, arranged to form a particular  
 pattern.121 
 
At first, many viewers who are unfamiliar with this illusion may 
see nothing but arbitrary noise. If they persist, however, most will 
eventually perceive the outline of a face (it may help to hold the 
image at a distance or to slightly blur one’s vision), which they will 
recognize as belonging to Abraham Lincoln. Indeed, once we see the 
image, it is hard to make it go away or to see the squares as anything 
but a portrait.122 At the same time, though, it is quite hard to put 
into words what about the squares, exactly, that makes them so 
evocative of Lincoln.  
For our next example, consider the poster in Figure 2. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Poster for a collegiate drama program.123 
Did you notice anything wrong? If not, look again!  
 
121. From Leon D. Harmon & Bela Julesz, Masking in Visual Recognition: 
Effects of Two-Dimensional Filtered Noise, 180 Science 1194, 1194 
(1973). Reprinted with permission from the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS). 
122. Howard Margolis, Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A 
Theory of Judgment 37–39 (1987).  
123. JOHN P. FRISBY & JAMES V. STONE, SEEING: THE COMPUTATIONAL 
APPROACH TO BIOLOGICAL VISION 201 fig.8.32 (2d ed. 2010). Reprinted 
with permission from John P. Frisby.  
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For many of us—including the people who initially had this 
poster printed and distributed before noticing that anything was 
wrong with it—the misspelling of the word “Spring” is initially 
surprisingly hard to see. Our brains see most of the letters in the word 
“Spring” in a context in which that word would be appropriate and 
fill in the gap to make the message make sense. But once we have 
recognized the mistake, we no longer find it difficult to notice; if 
anything, it is hard to take our eyes off it!124  
These two images, taken together, help illustrate some profound 
facts. First, we can recognize familiar patterns, even when they are 
obscured by an astonishing amount of noise. We constantly depend on 
this ability without realizing how much mental work is actually 
involved in making it possible.125 Indeed, some have suggested that 
many dazzling expert performances, such as a chess master’s ability 
to quickly recognize a bad move, should be attributed more to the 
expert’s familiarity with a large number of situationally significant 
patterns than with the expert’s application of rule-like knowledge.126 
System 1 allows us to recover meaning even in garbled 
communications. If the garbling is small, our associative minds may 
recover the appropriate meaning without our ever noticing that 
something is wrong. Indeed, if we relax and let System 1 do its 
associative work, we can often recover meaning in astonishingly 
degraded information streams.127 
Second, these two images illustrate the fact that System 1 does 
not just allow us to notice patterns; it bosses us into seeing those 
patterns to the exclusion of other possibilities.128 The drama poster 
shows this most dramatically. At first glance, we may automatically 
read the word as “Spring” without noticing anything wrong because 
System 1 automatically associated a related pattern of letters to a 
known pattern. But once we have seen the misspelling, there is no 
going back; System 1 now associates the cluster of inputs to the 
somewhat odd and unfamiliar word, “Sring,” and cannot see it any 
other way.  
System 1, it seems, can recognize patterns with fluid ease, but it 
tends to see only one pattern at a time, even when stimuli are 
 
124. MARGOLIS, supra note 122, at 10–11.  
125. See Sharon Gilad-Gutnick et al., Recognizing Degraded Faces: The 
Contribution of Configural and Featural Cues, 41 Perception 1497, 
1497, 1506–08 (2012). 
126. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 11. 
127. Idneed, msot radeers wlil hvae reltaievly lttile tourble decdoing tihs 
sreioulsy gabrled snetnece bceuase tehy wlil rpadily aissmliate each 
mispeleld wrod to a fmaliiar pttaern.  
128. See Margolis, supra note 122, at 39–41 (describing this tendency as 
“pattern-seeking, pattern-dominated cognition”). 
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somewhat ambiguous between multiple possibilities. This is illustrated 
most dramatically by the classic illusion of the Necker cube, included 
below as Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The Necker cube. 
The Necker cube shows us the edges of a three-dimensional cube 
projected onto a two-dimensional plane, and as such, it is ambiguous. 
We can view it so that either the top right or the lower left vertex are 
closer to us, with the other on the “back” of the cube. But what is 
striking is that we cannot see the cube as ambiguous between the two 
states. Seeing the cube as “in-between”—or seeing it as merely a flat 
drawing of lines meeting at odd angles on a sheet of paper—is nearly 
impossible to do. System 1, it seems, strongly assimilates inputs to a 
single pattern and resists ambiguity in classification.129  
Perhaps surprisingly, System 1 can perform its pattern-
recognizing function even when we cannot perceive any patterns 
consciously. In one experiment, participants in a gambling game were 
offered a choice among several decks of cards from which they could 
draw, with rewards and penalties distributed seemingly at random 
among the cards in each deck.130 This apparent randomness concealed 
a pattern: over time, the gains and losses in some decks averaged out 
 
129. See Paul Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, 12 Behav. & Brain Sci. 
435, 438–39 (1989); see also Keith E. Stanovich, Distinguishing the 
Reflective, Algorithmic, and Autonomous Minds: Is It Time for a Tri-
Process Theory?, in Two Minds, supra note 29, at 55, 68–70 (exploring 
the concept of focal bias, in which an intuitively attractive 
representation becomes focal and dominates further cognition, leading 
participants to hunt for confirmatory evidence rather than seek further 
information in a neutral way).  
130. Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the 
Advantageous Strategy, 275 Science 1293, 1293 (1997). Further 
evidence of unconscious pattern-learning effects have been developed in 
experiments whenever a certain stimulus arises in an ongoing sequence. 
See generally Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans, Can Sequence 
Learning Be Implicit? New Evidence with the Process Dissociation 
Procedure, 8 Psychonomic Bull. & Rev. 343 (2001) (finding that 
when data are structured in a way that incorporates complex patterns, 
study participants are often able to exploit the pattern unconsciously, 
achieving faster reaction times than in control conditions, even though 
they are not aware that a pattern exists). 
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to a net gain, while in others they averaged out to net losses. 
Intriguingly, participants seemed to learn which decks were favorable 
before they could verbalize that knowledge; they grew more likely to 
choose the winning decks, and they showed signs of stress when 
drawing from the losing decks even while they insisted that the decks 
seemed equivalent. Thus, they had unconsciously discovered a pattern 
without any conscious access to that knowledge.131 To the extent that 
our associative minds can notice patterns more subtle than we can 
consciously perceive, they may produce intuitions that outpace our 
ability to consciously explain. 
Now that we have seen the surprising power of System 1, let us 
consider some of the ways it may lead us astray. One key difference 
between System 1’s associative engine and explicit System 2 cognition 
is that the former is unable to ignore particular inputs merely because 
they are “irrelevant.” The result is that inputs we would confidently 
say are irrelevant to our current tasks sometimes affect our behavior 
without our knowing.132  
The phenomenon of associative “priming” demonstrates 
System 1’s inability to screen out some stimuli as situationally 
irrelevant. A standard way to demonstrate priming effects involves 
first exposing a participant to a concept in a manner too subtle for 
them to perceive and then measuring its impact on their reaction time 
in other, related tasks.133 For example, studies show that if we test 
people on the speed with which they can distinguish English words 
from meaningless garbled letters, a person who had been primed with 
the concept “chair” via a quick, subliminal flash of that word on a 
screen would show faster reaction times when identifying related 
words like “table,” but not unrelated words like “cow.”134 Because of 
this variance in reaction times, we know that the unconscious 
representation of the “chair” concept has been activated, even though 
it was without the person’s awareness.  
Associative activations can also spread through intervening 
mental concepts, causing some stimuli to have truly surprising effects 
on judgment and behavior. Thus, for instance, seeing the word “gift” 
has primed study participants to more swiftly recognize the word 
“pie,” even though gifts and pies have no direct experiential relation 
 
131. Bechara et al., supra note 130, at 1293. 
132. See generally Wilson, supra note 28, at 93–115 (“How well do people 
know the causes of their judgments, feelings, and actions? There are 
cases in the psychological literature of people who are so ignorant of 
why they respond the way they do that they have to invent 
explanations.”). 
133. Schacter, supra note 111, at 11115. 
134. Id.  
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for most people, because gifts associate to birthdays, which associate 
to cake, which associates to pie.135  
Priming may have strong adaptive value, allowing us to respond 
more quickly to stimuli that predictably occur in particular settings. 
But priming has a darker, stranger side as well. By placing ourselves 
in a state of readiness to encounter certain patterns in our 
environments, we may also increase the frequency with which we will 
perceive those patterns in ambiguous stimuli, and thus introduce a 
biasing tendency into our perceptions, choices, or behavior.136 Once we 
have started to see a situation in a particular way, we may have 
trouble seeing it any other way, regardless of additional evidence.137  
In the simplest form of this phenomenon, stereotypical primes 
that we encounter in our environments may shape our perceptions or 
decisions. Thus, in a disturbing set of experiments, participants 
primed with cues that activate mental patterns associated with 
African American stereotypes, such as hearing violent rap music, were 
more likely to associate an individual in a story who has an African 
American–sounding name with hostility, sexism, and low 
intelligence.138  
When one adds spreading associative connections into the mix, 
the picture gets even stranger. Consider, for instance, the “halo 
effect,” which describes our tendency to associate one type of positive 
trait with other, unrelated traits that also have a positive valence.139 
For instance, most people exhibit a “beauty bias”: they tend to 
assume that attractive people will exhibit heightened forms of a 
variety of positive characteristics, such as kindness, intelligence, and 
honesty.140 Perhaps of greatest relevance to the legal system, we 
unconsciously expect pretty people to be truth-tellers and thus more 
likely to believe what they say, even if we have other means of 
assessing their credibility.141 Most of us would find the idea that we 
 
135. See McNamara, supra note 118, at 507, 514–16.  
136. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 29–30. 
137. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 68–70. 
138. See Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit 
Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 133, 147 (2002) (finding 
that negative stereotypes of African American “may be perpetuated by 
(some) rap music, at least in college-aged subjects”).  
139. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can 
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately 
Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1266–67 (2005). 
140. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The American 
Jury on Trial: Psychological Perspectives 100 (1988); Reinhard 
& Sporer, supra note 114, at 95–97. 
141. See Reinhard & Sporer, supra note 114, at 101–02.  
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are systematically more likely to find attractive people as credible 
hard to defend, but such behavior follows a straightforward 
associative logic. Beauty, like honesty, is something we praise 
culturally, something we generally find pleasing, and something we 
view as good rather than bad. Thus, activating our mental 
representation of attractiveness primes us to see good, pleasant, 
praiseworthy things, and honesty is another pattern matching that 
description. For this reason, if we are facing a close question regarding 
a person’s believability, their attractiveness may play a role in 
determining the answer we find intuitively plausible.142 
One further, surprising aspect of associative inferences is that our 
physical and emotional feelings can also activate associations that 
exert an unconscious influence on our choices and behavior. One 
example of this phenomenon, mentioned above, involves the role of 
disgust in moral evaluation. Part of our emotional reaction to serious 
moral violations can involve a physical feeling of disgust or revulsion. 
But in the logic of associative processing, such connections can also 
occur in reverse: because we have felt disgusted when sensing norm 
violations in the past, we become primed to see norm violations 
whenever we feel disgusted, regardless of the reason why.143 Thus, 
researchers have found that inducing disgust by clearly irrelevant 
means (such as by making a room look disorderly or introducing a 
foul smell into the air) makes research participants more likely to 
condemn ambiguous behavior as immoral.144  
So it turns out that associative cognition can affect our judgments 
and decisions in ways that are far from obvious. Although I have set 
out some ways in which the associative system can let us down from 
time to time, I do not wish to be alarmist. Most of the time, 
associative cognition is a powerful and useful tool, allowing us to 
recognize patterns based on subtle features even when those features 
are blurred by noise or hard to put into words. But if we are to 
provide a useful account of the role of such processing in fact-finding 
 
142. In another striking example of spreading associative activity, 
participants who were exposed to physical warmth became more likely 
to see other people as emotionally warm. See Lawrence E. Williams & 
John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal 
Warmth, 322 Science 606 (2008). 
143. Schnall et al., supra note 113, at 1105.  
144. Id. at 1097–105. Similarly, we might feel cross or angry when we ponder 
moral violations, and thus we might expect feelings of irritation to 
produce similar effects. This is just what we observe. In a recent study, 
Israeli judges turned out to be stricter in their sentencing decisions if 
they had been sitting on the bench for a long time without a break. See 
Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 6889, 6889 (2011). 
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cognition, we must keep both its strengths and its weaknesses in 
mind.  
C. System 2 Processes Information in a Conscious, Effortful Manner 
Having considered System 1 processes in some depth, let us now 
turn our attention to System 2 cognition. One of the first key 
hallmarks of System 2 processing is that it takes place within the 
explicit view of conscious awareness and is thus available to 
introspective awareness.145 When System 1 gives us an answer, we 
know what the answer is but not how we arrived at it. By contrast, 
when System 2 is doing the work, we are aware of the work that goes 
into producing the outcome and experience a series of internal steps 
involved in getting there.146 
A second, closely related hallmark of System 2 cognition is that it 
is ego depleting, meaning that we find it mentally taxing to employ 
and need to use willpower in order to keep it going.147 All of us, I am 
sure, have experienced this feeling, such as when trying to do a 
complicated bit of mental math.148 In this respect, System 2 cognitive 
processes seem analogous to physical exercise. People generally save 
their mental strength if they know they will have to use it in the 
future, and if they have recently expended their willpower to focus on 
a task, they will find it harder to repeat the performance until they 
have rested.149 So, while our associative cognition happens 
automatically and effortlessly, our System 2 is activated only with an 
effort, and we will find ourselves weary if we use it for too long 
without taking a break. 
A third significant feature of System 2 is that it often involves the 
manipulation of words, symbols, or images held in working memory.150 
 
145. See Evans, supra note 99, at 257–58; see also Carruthers, supra note 
101, at 109–10; Frankish, supra note 101, at 96–97. 
146. See Evans, supra note 99, at 258–59 (noting that System 2 functions by 
means of a sequential flow of conscious thinking through a limited-
capacity working memory system). 
147. See Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of 
Self-Control: A Meta Analysis, 136 Psychol. Bull. 495, 496 (2010); 
E.J. Masicampo & Roy F. Baumeister, Toward a Physiology of Dual-
Process Reasoning and Judgment: Lemonade, Willpower, and Expensive 
Rule-Based Analysis, 19 Psychol. Sci. 255, 259 (2008). See generally 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of 
Self-Control, 61 Emory L.J. 501, 538–43 (2013) (reviewing literature on 
the strength model of self-control). 
148. A simple demonstration of the sensations involved can be obtained by 
mentally adding together any two randomly chosen four-digit numbers.  
149. See Hagger et al., supra note 147, at 496–97; Masicampo & Baumeister, 
supra note 147, at 259–60. 
150. See Evans & Over, supra note 101, at 154; Frankish, supra note 101, 
at 92–93.  
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A bit of introspection shows that many of our conscious thoughts take 
linguistic or imagistic form. If we try to monitor the nature of our 
own thoughts, we may hear words in our mental ears or see images in 
our mind’s eye. For some types of System 2 cognition, such sounds 
and images may be an integral part of mental processing.151 For 
instance, when we add a column of numbers in our heads or consider 
the validity of a logical argument, we often hold symbols in mind in 
sequence, mentally applying rules in order to transform them in steps 
toward a final result.  
To be clear, the fact that symbols or mathematics is at stake is 
not a necessary sign of System 2 processing; if we are familiar enough 
with a particular problem, we may have integrated its answer into our 
underlying associative system. Thus, any adult who has learned his 
multiplication tables as a child knows the answer to the question, 
“What is 4 times 5?” without having to manipulate any numbers in 
active memory. But if the question shifts to, “What is 105 times 32?,” 
no answer will spring to mind, and our associative system will be 
dumbfounded. Instead, we can solve the problem only by applying a 
series of learned rules, and, in so doing, we will experience all of the 
hallmarks of System 2 cognition. Our conscious minds will be 
occupied, and we will experience the task as effortful. It is this sort of 
symbolic manipulation that is another core, identifying feature of 
System 2 processing. System 1 can do many things well, but applying 
explicitly learned rules to truly novel situations is simply beyond its 
capabilities.  
One final benefit of System 2’s ability to reason by way of the 
sequential manipulation of symbols and images is that it enables us to 
more easily consider hypothetical scenarios and their likely 
consequences. As we explored above, System 1’s pattern recognition 
feature seems to rapidly assimilate even ambiguous stimuli to the 
closest known pattern.152 Thus, once we have seen Lincoln’s face in 
the squares, it is hard to see other potential patterns that they might 
make. This difficulty illustrates the general tendency of System 1 
processing to default to a single model of reality.153 But for many 
problems that we face—including many problems in the law—the 
ability to reason counterfactually is critical. This ability requires 
simultaneously knowing the true state of the world and imagining 
what would happen if the facts were otherwise. System 2 provides us 
with a means to achieve this by letting us consciously manipulate 
symbols and images in order to engage in hypothetical reasoning.154 
Using these explicit semantic representations, we can describe events 
 
151. See Frankish, supra note 101, at 92–93. 
152. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
153. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 67. 
154. See id. at 21–22, 61–63.  
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that we have not observed or which we do not currently believe and 
then imagine the consequences that would follow if our imagined 
scenarios were true, without—as System 1 would—immediately 
treating our descriptions as the true state of affairs. Thus, this System 
2 feature enables us to pose hypothetical or counterfactual questions 
and explore their answers.  
D. The Complex Interplay of Dual-Process Reasoning 
Although the manipulation of symbols and hypothetical scenarios 
is an important function of System 2, it is not the whole story. A 
significant volume of System 2 activity involves the exercise of self-
control, in which we try to guide or restrain the results of automatic 
System 1 processing.155 If I tell you to stare intently at a particular 
word on a page for a long stretch of time, you will find that your 
conscious mind is occupied in an effortful way, indicating that 
System 2 is involved in the task. But this sort of effortful focusing of 
attention surely does not involve symbol manipulation. Similarly, if 
you have committed yourself to losing weight, you may sometimes 
find yourself in a common conundrum, in which a tasty treat is 
available to you but your goal is to avoid eating it. The common 
element in both settings is that we must resist our automatic 
impulses, which prompt us to pay attention to distractions and to eat 
anything that we associate with pleasurable tastes. And because 
System 2 resources require the active use of conscious willpower, we 
will find these innate impulses harder to resist as we become 
distracted or tired.  
This self-control function, combined with System 2’s potential to 
use semantic reasoning to avoid associatively driven errors, is 
potentially very attractive as a means of improving the judgments 
and choices that would arise from an unmonitored System 1. Thus, 
for instance, there is a well-documented feature of Type 1 processing 
known as “belief bias,” in which people who are trying to work out 
whether a logical argument is technically correct will often approve of 
faulty arguments if those arguments are used to support true 
conclusions.156 It turns out, however, that the extent to which people 
fall prey to belief bias hinges on the degree to which System 2 
processes are actively involved in solving the problem. Thus, when 
 
155. See Masicampo & Baumeister, supra note 147, at 256. See generally 
Klaus Fiedler et al., Exerting Control over Allegedly Automatic 
Associative Processes, in Psychology of Self-Regulation: 
Cognitive, Affective, and Motivational Processes 249, 249–69 
(Joseph P. Forgas et al., eds., 2009) (reviewing literature on executive 
overrides of automatic System 1 processes). 
156. See Evans, supra note 99, at 264–65; see also Dan Simon, In Doubt: 
The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process 22–25 (2012) 
(describing this as “conformation bias”). 
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research participants must allocate working memory to other tasks or 
answer too quickly to think through the problem sequentially, errors 
are more likely; conversely, when people are encouraged to reason 
deductively, such errors are reduced.157  
This potential for these conscious overrides of System 1 responses 
suggests that a good way to avoid System 1 errors would be to 
employ System 2 reasoning as often as possible. This approach, 
however, is not the panacea it may seem. System 2 processing is not 
always engaged in order to monitor or override our intuitive impulses. 
It can also be engaged to defend or explain such instincts in ways that 
make them appear more reasonable than they really are.158  
The role of System 2 as an unwitting apologist for the results of 
unconscious cognition has been well documented. One type of 
evidence comes from studies of “split-brain” patients, who underwent 
surgeries to sever the fibers that connected the two hemispheres of 
their brains (the corpus callosum) in order to treat chronic seizures.159 
The split-brain patients allowed researchers an unusual opportunity 
because the left hemispheres of their brains, which typically manage 
language functions, had no direct inputs from the right hemispheres, 
which lack speech-producing capabilities. In studies of such patients, 
researchers have observed a surprising phenomenon: the left, speaking 
side of the brain will invent reasons for actions initiated by the right, 
silent side, even though the former is ignorant of the stimuli that 
motivated the latter’s action.160 Even more strikingly, patients who 
engage in such confabulation do not seem to be aware that their 
fabricated reasons were not the real reason for their actions.161 
 
157. See Evans, supra note 99, at 264–65 (reviewing literature). 
158. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 Psychol. Rev. 814, 818 
(2001). See generally Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, 
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 
84 Pscyhol. Rev. 231 (1977) (collecting many examples of 
unconsciously confabulated explanations of associatively determined 
behaviors). 
159. Wilson, supra note 28, at 95.  
160. Id. at 96–97. 
161. One such patient, P.S., was shown two images simultaneously, one in 
each eye, and then asked to choose a card with a related image. The left 
side of his brain was shown a picture of a chicken claw, while the right 
side was shown a snow scene. When offered the chance to choose a card 
with his right hand, he chose a chicken card, which matched what his 
left brain had seen; when choosing with his left hand, he chose a shovel, 
matching the snowy scene that was shown to his right brain. He found 
it easy to explain both decisions: He chose the chicken because it 
matched the claw, and he chose the shovel because “you have to clean 
out the chicken shed with a shovel.” Id. at 96. But his explanation, of 
course, had nothing to do with his choice of the shovel, because his left 
hand was guided by his right brain, which had been shown a snowy 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding 
170 
This sort of confabulation is not confined to split-brain patients, 
however. One striking example of System 2’s ability to generate false 
reasons for unconsciously induced choices was seen in an experiment 
by Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, who arranged 
four identical pairs of nylon stockings on a table and then asked 
passersby to give them comparative ratings as part of a fictitious 
marketing survey. Despite the fact that the stockings were identical, 
viewers expressed a clear statistical tendency to prefer the rightmost 
item (chosen by 40%) and to disfavor the leftmost item (12%).162 The 
exact reasons for this “right-side bias” are somewhat mysterious,163 
but the main point is that none of the participants believed that the 
location of the stockings had anything to do with their preferences, 
and all but one participant (who happened to be a psychology 
student) denied that any such influence was possible when asked 
directly. Rather, they invented fictitious differences between the 
stockings in terms of “knit, weave, sheerness, elasticity or 
workmanship” to justify their right-skewing preferences.164 
One final example may serve to drive the point home as starkly as 
possible. Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt used hypnosis to prime 
participants to feel disgust when reading certain words and then had 
the participants evaluate several stories.165 One of these stories 
involved no plausible moral violation: it described a student council 
leader who was “in charge of scheduling discussions about academic 
issues” and who tried to choose topics that “appeal to both professors 
and students in order to stimulate discussion.”166 Some of the 
hypnotically disgusted participants nevertheless rated the student 
council member’s actions as morally wrong, even though no unprimed 
participant agreed.167 Significantly, some hypnotized participants 
invented strained reasons that they claimed explained their peculiar 
 
scene rather than anything to do with chickens. Despite this disconnect, 
P.S. “seemed perfectly comfortable with his answer and had no idea 
that it was a confabulation.” Id.  
162. Timothy de Camp Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of 
Verbal Reports of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 Soc. 
Psychol. 118, 123 (1978).  
163. Cf. Daniel Cassanto, Embodiment of Abstract Concepts: Good and Bad 
in Right- and Left-Handers, 138 J. Experimental Psychol.: Gen. 
351, 365 (suggesting that right- and left-handed people tend to associate 
their dominant side with positive affect ideas and their non-dominant 
side with negative affect ideas). 
164. Wilson & Nisbett, supra note 162, at 124.  
165. Thalia Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral 
Judgment More Severe, 16 Psychol. Sci. 780, 780–83 (2005). 
166. Id. at 782. 
167. Id. at 782–83. 
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moral judgments: the council leader, they said, was “up to something” 
or was a “popularity-seeking snob.”168  
To sum up, our perceptions, decisions, and judgments are the 
product of two different, sometimes interacting, modes of cognition. 
System 1 processes information swiftly, effortlessly, and automatically; 
it has an almost magical ability to detect and recognize patterns. But 
the same associative structure that allows System 1 to detect patterns 
amidst the noise can fail us when it has been trained on a misleading 
set of examples or when some of its associative levers have been 
primed into activity by irrelevant stimuli. System 2, by contrast, 
works slowly, requires mental effort, and is capable of abstract and 
hypothetical analysis. With these capabilities, System 2 plays a dual 
role, sometimes overriding System 1’s mistakes and at other times 
working to justify our associative intuitions. 
III. A Dual-Process Account of Fact-Finding 
Now that we have explored dual-process models of ordinary 
cognition, it is time to consider how these processes affect legal fact-
finding. In this Part, I will attempt to describe the ways in which our 
two distinct styles of information processing interact when judges and 
juries decide cases.  
My account places System 1 at center stage: fact finders arrive 
with preexisting networks of associations between various potential 
facts and concepts of guilt and criminality. Then, fact finders 
supplement their networks with new associations based on the case’s 
facts and evidence. During the trial itself, System 2 is primarily 
engaged in the task of maintaining focus on the evidence items 
because of the largely passive nature of the jury and judicial 
instructions encouraging them to refrain from decision until the 
parties have finished presenting their cases.169 By the end of a trial, 
 
168. Id. at 783. 
169. See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 1 Int’l J. Evid. & Proof 254, 261–62 (1996). 
(suggesting that juries have preconceived notions about facts and laws, 
which may or may not be accurate, and cannot appropriately evaluate 
information as they receive it). System 2 is unlikely to significantly 
constrain System 1’s associative activity, except through attentional 
focus processes—that is, by trying to resist the pull of these distracting 
thoughts and to maintain focus on the witnesses’ testimony. In fact, 
excessive explicit processing would tend to distract the jury from 
listening to the evidence, based on the well-documented phenomena of 
inattentional blindness, in which focused mental work generally limits 
our ability to attend to environmental stimuli. See, e.g., Christopher F. 
Chabris et al., You Do Not Talk About Fight Club If You Do Not Notice 
Fight Club: Inattentional Blindness for a Simulated Real-World Assault, 
2 Perception 150 (2011) (showing a majority of research participants 
who were placed in a cognitive-load condition failed to observe a violent 
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most fact finders will have developed intuitive feelings about the right 
answer in the case, which will be a product of an unconscious 
associative model. At the final stages of a case, however, System 2 
processes will also play an important role. By fitting the pieces of 
evidence into stories, analyzing the fit between factual judgments and 
verdict categories, and applying semantically structured burdens of 
proof, judges and juries may use their deliberative faculties either to 
protect their intuitions or to override them. Figure 4 may help to 
clarify some of these interactions. 
 
 
Figure 4: Chart depicting the interactions between System 1 and 
System 2 cognition processes during a trial.  
To make this framework as clear as possible, I will walk through 
the ways that it might be applied to understand the factual inferences 
that allowed the jury to reach a guilty verdict in Juan Rivera’s case. 
This exercise is, by necessity, speculative in nature; I do not have 
access to the private thoughts of the jurors in that case,170 and even 
the jurors themselves would be unable to report the unconscious 
 
physical confrontation in their environment). An implication of this is 
that, when one needs to absorb and retain large quantities of 
information, explicit mental processing may undermine—rather than 
facilitate—learning. 
170. None of the jurors were interviewed in connection with any media 
reports following the verdict or the appeal. 
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aspects of their fact-finding process. My analysis, moreover, will 
necessarily simplify the messy details of a month-long trial. But these 
limits should not worry us excessively because the goal of this 
discussion is not to implement a fully specified formal model nor to 
perfectly describe the reality of fact-finding in one case.171 Rather, my 
goal is to provide a descriptive account of the role that the two 
systems of cognition might play in a real-life case, and we can make 
progress toward this goal without a perfectly specified model or a 
godlike window into the minds of individual jurors. As this discussion 
will illustrate, a dual-process approach to modeling inference, unlike 
standard formulations of the Bayesian or story-comparison 
approaches, can explain why the pattern of evidence in cases like 
Rivera are likely to induce even well-meaning jurors to make 
seemingly indefensible verdict choices. 
A. System 1 Cognition at Trial: The Background Associative Model  
To visualize the role of associative networks in fact-finding, it will 
help to first establish a useful metaphor: the interactive connectionist 
network. Previously described as an alternative to Bayesianism 
models, connectionist networks are systems comprising many simple 
units, which are connected by edges, or connections, into a larger 
network.172 Each unit might be connected with many others, and the 
connections may vary in terms of their weight. Over time, the units 
can take on various activation values, indicating that the unit is 
currently in active use. When one unit is active, the connections 
between it and other units will impact the activation values of the 
connected units, varying in effect based on the weight of the 
connection.173 If the weight is positive, the connection will have an 
excitatory effect, such that one active unit will amplify the value of 
the unit to which it is linked. If the weight is negative, that unit will 
have an inhibitory effect and act to lower the activation value of the 
connected unit instead of amplifying it.174 These weighted connections 
 
171. See discussion supra Part II. 
172. BECHTEL & ABRAHAMSEN, supra note 88, at 23. I am not the first 
researcher to use connectionist models to describe fact-finding cognition. 
Cf. Thagard’s Causal Inference, supra note 88, at 232 (exploring judicial 
reasoning in a trial according to computational model using both 
explanatory coherence and Bayesian networks); Simon, supra note 5, at 
520–23 (evaluating a connectionist model to understand coherence shifts 
in mock juror cognition). To my knowledge, however, I am the first to 
suggest combining a connectionist account of System 1 activity with a 
nonconnectionist, motivation-driven account of System 2 activity. For a 
more general discussion of the associative cognitive process that informs 
the connectionist model see supra Part II.B. 
173. BECHTEL & ABRAHAMSEN, supra note 88, at 24. 
174. Id. at 24–25. 
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allow the network to express, in an intuitive way, the idea that we 
have learned to expect to encounter some concepts in combination 
(like thunder and lightning), while other concepts tend to imply each 
other’s absence (like rain and sunshine).  
Finally, such networks may also evolve and learn through the 
implementation of rules that allow the weights of connections to 
change in response to shifting patterns of unit activations over time.175 
Donald Hebb developed a learning rule that can help a connectionist 
system learn to more accurately model the associations that are 
present in its environment. In his simple model, when two units are 
simultaneously activated, the weight of the connection between them 
will be strengthened; when one is active and the other suppressed, the 
weight will become weakened or even inhibitory.176 Over time, this 
means that units that “fire together, wire together.”177 
Once a model has been constructed and trained on a set of inputs, 
it can simulate certain kinds of cognition. Figure 5 provides a visual 
illustration of such a very simple connectionist network, which James 
McClelland designed to encode the demographic characteristics of the 
members of the two gangs from West Side Story, the “Jets” and the 
“Sharks.”178 
 
175. See generally id. at 66–105 (discussing learning strategies that have been 
developed for connectionist networks). 
176. Id. at 72. See generally Peter Dayan & L.F. Abbott, Theoretical 
Neuroscience: Computational and Mathematical Modeling of 
Neural Systems 281–93 (2001) (providing background information 
about the Hebbian Rule and learning). 
177. Bernard J. Baars & Nicole M. Gage, COGNITION, BRAIN, AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS: INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 83 (2d ed. 
2010). 
178. James L. McClelland, Retrieving General and Specific Information from 
Stored Knowledge of Specifics, Proc. Third Ann. Conf. Cognitive 
Sci. Soc’y 170, 171 (1981). Astute readers will notice that the features 
ascribed to members of the Jets and the Sharks bear virtually no 
relation to any characters in the actual musical. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding 
175 
 
Figure 5: A visual depiction of a connectionist model, illustrating the 
characteristics of five hypothetical gang members.179 
With the help of Figure 5, the nature of connectionist models 
should become clearer. If one activates a unit representing one of the 
individuals’ names, the connection flowing away from that unit will 
activate a central unit, which will in turn activate other units that 
encode various features of that individual.180 Thus, activating the 
name “Lance” will lead to activation of his central conceptual 
representation unit,181 which will in turn activate the units encoding 
for “20s,” “Bookie,” “married,” and so on. These other features, in 
turn, will propagate activation further. Thus, by thinking of Lance, 
one activates the “Jets” unit, which in turn leads to the weaker 
activation of other Jets. This neatly captures the idea that, by 
 
179. From James L. McClelland, Retrieving General and Specific 
Information from Stored Knowledge of Specifics, Proc. Third Ann. 
Conf. Cognitive Sci. Soc’y 170, 171 fig.1 (1981). Reprinted with 
permission from James L. McClelland.  
180. See generally Bechtel & Abrahamsen, supra note 88, at 21–47 
(describing the features and function of the Jets v. Sharks network). 
181. This central unit is a necessary feature of the network because no single 
feature, including the name “Lance,” could uniquely describe the 
individual in question. Rather, “Lance” is coded as a connected network 
of related concepts, including his name, age, gang membership, etc., and 
the central unit is what links all those concepts together. 
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thinking of Lance, you are primed to think of other members of his 
gang.182 
These connectionist networks can be implemented as formal 
models, but they can also be quite useful as visualization tools, 
helping us imagine the nature of networked associative processing, 
even as they necessarily simplify away some of the rich details of true 
human cognition.183 These models usefully illustrate the ways that 
associative activation propagates through the unconscious mind. The 
pattern-recognition power of the associative machine, its tendency to 
exhibit strange priming effects, and its resistance to updating based 
on certain kinds of inputs are all relatively easy to describe in this 
framework, regardless of whether we could crack open an individual’s 
skull and point to physical structures that map neatly onto the 
descriptions below. 
With the analytic framework introduced, let us consider the 
nature of unconscious factual cognition at trial. The first point that 
must be emphasized is that judges and juries do not begin a trial as a 
tabula rasa, but rather start the trial with preexisting associative 
networks based on their past experiences.184 This means that, before 
we can start to describe how a juror might process the Rivera 
evidence, we should first consider the existing set of patterns that she 
will be predisposed to see in any pattern of evidence. 
Thus, let us imagine our hypothetical juror before she has heard 
any evidence or arguments in the Rivera case. Before the lawyers and 
witnesses have begun to speak, our juror will have already heard 
about many criminal cases, whether on the news or in fictional 
accounts, some of which may involve similar elements to the case she 
is about to hear. From those cases, she may have unconsciously 
 
182. See discussion supra Part II. 
183. See Bechtel & Abrahamsen, supra note 88, at 101–03 (suggesting 
that connectionist models can integrate associative cognition with rule-
based cognition); Sloman, supra note 117, at 6–8, 19–20 (suggesting the 
use of connectionist models as a means of capturing associative aspects 
of cognition); Thagard, supra note 129, at 438–39 (using a connectionist 
network to model features of the Necker cube illusion). Such networks 
radically simplify some features of the biological brain, which may 
represent concepts in distributed form rather than as isolated and 
identifiable units within a larger network. Cf. Dayan & Abbott, supra 
note 176, at 230 (suggesting firing-rate models to simulate neural 
networks); 2 JAMES L. MCCLELLAND & DAVID E. RUMELHART, PARALLEL 
DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING: Psychological and Biological Models, 
164–66 (1986) (discussing the benefits of connection information 
distribution); Thagard, supra note 129, at 456–57 (distinguishing 
connectionist models using distributed representations from those using 
localist representations). This simplification is a feature, not a bug, 
when we are trying to find ways to visualize the complex and alien 
terrain of unconscious cognition.  
184. See Simon, supra note 5, at 536. 
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learned that certain facts tend to occur in conjunction with other 
facts. She starts the trial, in other words, with preexisting associative 
schemas connecting the concepts of “rape,” “murder,” and “guilt,” 
with other events or ideas. Figure 6 provides a way to visualize the 
operation of a small subset of these possible associations, dealing with 
concepts that associate closely with rape.185 
 
 
FIGURE 6: A simple network model illustrating a juror’s possible 
associations with rape.  
This simple network model is designed to illustrate a few ideas. 
First, note that some of the lines between units are solid, which 
indicates excitatory associative activation, while other lines are 
dotted, suggesting an inhibitory connection. These lines have varying 
weights, indicating that some of these relations are more powerful 
than others. This is designed to reflect the idea that activating some 
concepts in the associative unconscious may activate some related 
concepts while inhibiting other, dissonant concepts. For example, 
because it is hard to simultaneously intuit that conduct is peaceful 
and violent, the activation of one concept suppresses the other. Other 
aspects of the network may facilitate the intuitive recognition of guilt 
or innocence simultaneously, creating internal tension in the network. 
 
185. See Henry F. Fradella & Kegan Brown, The Effects of Using Social 
Scientific Rape Typologies on Juror Decisions to Convict, 31 Law & 
Psychol. Rev. 1, 4–6 (2007) (reviewing factors that may influence 
juror decisions in rape trials). 
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Thus, if a case involved both the use of a weapon and an alleged 
assault by an acquaintance, activation would be propagated 
simultaneously to the violent unit and the peaceful unit, which would 
then actively work to suppress each other, as well as the other units 
that are closely related. In such scenarios, the two families of related 
units would act competitively, and the model might well exhibit 
unstable cycles of fluctuating activations until one set of units 
eventually outcompetes the other and the network settles into a 
coherent and stable state.186  
Figure 6 also illustrates that our preexisting associative schema 
may sometimes diverge from what is normatively ideal. Although 
some of the connections built into this model are clearly sound—such 
as the inhibitory connection between rape and consent—other 
connections do not correspond to real-world rape-case patterns. For 
example, this model incorporates a widely held, but false, assumption 
that rapes are correlated more with encountering strangers than 
known associates.187 In fact, the reverse is true: the Department of 
Justice estimates that sixty-two percent of rapes are committed by 
“intimates” who have a prior sexual relationship with the victim.188 
But if the juror is operating with the set of associations described 
above, perhaps because that is the pattern of rape cases that the juror 
has encountered in the news and on TV, then that juror will tend to 
see rape more easily in cases involving strangers rather than 
intimates.  
B. The Impact of Party Appearance and Identification on the 
Background Associative Model 
Having visualized some of the details of a basic, preexisting 
associative model, let us now add the information that becomes 
available to jurors at the very start of a case. Before any evidence has 
been presented, jurors will be placed in the same room with the 
parties; there, the jurors will automatically begin integrating the 
parties into their associative matrices without realizing that they are 
“thinking” about anything at all. Figure 7 illustrates some of the 
associations that the Rivera jurors might have formed after sitting 
 
186. See Sloman, supra note 117, at 8 (referring to this state as a point of 
“minimum energy or of maximum harmony or coherence” which 
provides the desired inference) (citations omitted). 
187.  See Fradella & Brown, supra note 185, at 4 (noting that stereotypical 
beliefs among the public about rape, rape victims, and those accused of 
rape are often flawed).  
188. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THEONNES, NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, FULL 
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 44 (2000). 
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through jury selection and receiving initial instructions from the judge 
but before the lawyers started their opening statements. 
 
FIGURE 7: A network of pretrial associations a juror may have had with 
the defendant, Juan Rivera.  
At this stage, all our juror knows is Juan Rivera’s name, what he 
looks like, and his status as an accused defendant in a rape-murder 
case. Our juror may also know the official rule of our criminal justice 
system, which is that Rivera should be presumed innocent until he is 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But our simple model 
suggests that, at least at the level of unconscious associative 
processing, the jurors likely associated Rivera with guilt rather than 
innocence. First, news reports, water-cooler gossip, and crime dramas 
on TV are all likely to facilitate a strong associative link between 
“defendant” and “guilty.” This association is especially likely given 
the rarity with which innocent defendants are encountered in daily 
life. Second, the defendant’s ethnicity may also be used, more weakly, 
to associatively prime the concept of guilt.189 Finally, it is quite 
 
189. Cf. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The 
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 
187, 189–90, 206 (2010) (“[S]tudy participants held strong associations 
between Black and Guilty, relative to White and Guilty, and these 
implicit associations predicted the way mock jurors evaluated 
ambiguous evidence.”); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1170–71 (2008) (noting the problem of 
implicit preference for white over black, except by African American 
participants). I am not aware of research demonstrating a Hispanic-
Guilty association as carefully as has been done in studies of implicit 
associations regarding African-Americans, but it seems reasonable to 
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plausible to expect that our juror will associate lying with guilt, given 
that telling lies is itself a norm violation and (sometimes) a crime as 
well. Because our juror will be weakly primed by Rivera’s name, role, 
and appearance to intuit his guilt, our juror will also be primed to 
disbelieve what Rivera will say at trial. Thus, even before the lawyers 
begin their opening statements, and despite the nominal presumption 
of innocence, we can expect that the jurors will be developing an 
unconscious model of the case that connects his identity with guilt 
and deception. 
C. System 1 Cognition: Adding Case-Specific Units to the Associative 
Network in Response to Trial Evidence 
Next, let us consider how a juror’s associative model is altered by 
the parties’ presentations of evidence. In Rivera, the prosecution 
spent a substantial portion of its case-in-chief asking multiple 
witnesses to describe in great detail the scene of the murder. After 
both police witnesses and neighbors testified to the sequence of events 
that culminated in the discovery of Holly’s body, the jury saw 
numerous photographs of her corpse and the gruesome scene,190 as well 
as a video walk-through of the apartment taken by police while the 
body was still present.191 The prosecution also offered detailed autopsy 
testimony, including photos of each stab wound that the killer had 
inflicted on Holly, as well as close-up details of injuries to her genitals 
and anus from the rape.192 Formally, all of this evidence was only 
weakly relevant to the case. Both the prosecution and the defense 
agreed that Holly had been brutally raped and murdered. And 
although the prosecution wished to suggest that the dirty scene or 
careless autopsy practices might have led to contamination of the 
forensic DNA evidence, that contention was rejected by all the expert 
witnesses who testified on that subject.193 Indeed, perhaps for this 
reason, the defense did not even bother to cross-examine many of 
these initial witnesses. 
 
assume that similar associations exist. And even if there were no direct 
associations of that type, we would expect spreading activation to follow 
a Hispanic-Minority-Black-Guilty path, so that even in the best-case 
scenario, Rivera’s ethnicity would have weakly primed the idea of guilt.  
190. See, e.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 013868 (describing the admittance 
of a crime scene photo of Holly’s nude and bloody corpse to the jury); 
id. at 013908–21 (describing the admission of many additional photos, 
including shots of blood-covered toys and the victim’s bloody handprints 
on the wall). 
191. Id. at 013897–901. 
192. Id. at 015760–812. 
193. People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 58–59, 62–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
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Although this res gestae evidence might seem inconsequential if 
viewed from a detached, analytical standpoint, it may have been quite 
powerful in its ability to structure the associative networks that the 
jurors were unconsciously constructing. In terms of the testimony 
itself, the repeated references and images of Holly’s body and its 
condition would create associations only between that girl and 
concepts like violence, blood, and death. But the evidence in the case 
was not the only sensory input that was training this fledgling 
associative network; rather, the jury was also subject to the ongoing 
stimulus of the defendant’s presence in the room. Figure 8 illustrates 
these associations.  
 
FIGURE 8: An associative network that jurors may have been 
constructing during the trial of Juan Rivera.  
Thus, with an associative network already somewhat primed to 
associate Rivera, a non-Caucasian defendant, with guilt generally and 
therefore with rape and murder more specifically, the jurors started 
the case by encountering a steady stream of images of violent death 
with Rivera in the room as a continuing co-stimulus. And although 
there were many other individuals in the room, it is quite likely that 
the jurors gave special focus to Rivera, in part because it would be all 
too human to ask, under such circumstances, whether the person in 
front of you could have done such awful things. Thus, by having the 
jurors share a room with Rivera and pictures of gruesome death for 
several days, the prosecution was likely able to induce a reasonably 
strong unconscious association between Rivera, the scene of the crime, 
and the violent nature of Holly’s death. As a result, the jurors would 
have had a natural tendency to interpret subsequent ambiguous 
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evidence in a manner that was consistent with these associations.194 
Here we see a key way that the dual-process model differs from prior 
approaches: evidence that no one would think of as relevant to the 
defendant’s claimed alibi defense may, at the unconscious level, be 
priming jurors to view that defense with skepticism when it is raised 
later in the trial. 
After exposing the jury to extensive images and testimony about 
the crime itself, the prosecution next called multiple witnesses who 
recounted various instances where Rivera lied to officers during the 
early phases of the murder investigation. According to several 
witnesses, Rivera had, at various times, claimed he attended, on the 
night of the crime, a party that never occurred;195 alleged another 
individual was guilty of the crime, even though that individual was in 
fact not involved;196 and asked an acquaintance to help him concoct 
an alibi for the night of the crime.197 This phase of the prosecution’s 
case had one obvious, evidentially proper purpose: to suggest that 
because Rivera was telling lies relating to the crime, he may have 
been conscious of his own guilt and trying to deflect investigators’ 
interest onto other targets.  
This evidence, however, would also have a more nuanced impact 
on the jury’s fact-finding in a second, more subtle way. Connecting 
Rivera with lying may have significantly influenced the jurors’ 
unconscious associative models of the case, triggering other 
associations that weakened Rivera’s subsequent positions in 
nonobvious ways. Thus, because we generally associate lying with 
bad, immoral, guilty behavior, the jury was likely further primed to 
view Rivera as a person likely to engage in other kinds of bad 
 
194. See Simon, supra note 5, at 537–38 (describing the impact of adverse 
information about a defendant on a coherence network); cf. Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997) (discussing the prejudicial 
effect of evidence of a defendant’s past violent crime); Risinger, supra 
note 25, at 442–46 (suggesting that prosecutors use heartstrings-and-
gore evidence in part because seeing the “horror of the crime” may make 
jurors less willing to bear the risk of a wrongful acquittal). 
195. Rivera had claimed that he went to a party at the home of a friend, 
Shanita Craig, located near the scene of the crime. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 
at 56. In fact, there was no party at Craig’s house that night. Id. 
196. Rivera had reported to investigators that he saw a Hispanic or African 
American individual leave Craig’s party for an hour and then return to 
the party in a disheveled state. The man, according to Rivera, had been 
breathless and sweaty when he returned, with disheveled clothing and a 
bloody scratch on his face. See, e.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 
013967–68. Rivera later admitted that this, like his attendance at the 
party, was a fabrication. Id. at 014212. 
197. According to a man named Michael Jackson, Rivera had made this 
request while the two were in the Lake County jail. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 
at 58. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding 
183 
behavior, including the rape and murder at issue.198 But this strong 
link between Rivera and lying would also, quite likely, help prime the 
jurors to view other people connected with Rivera as liars themselves. 
Thus, by strongly painting Rivera as a liar, the prosecution also 
effectively planted the suggestion—in the jury’s unconscious 
associative network—that his counsel, his family, and other witnesses 
on his behalf might also be lying. Even though he never took the 
stand, Rivera’s lack of credibility may have spread like a virus to 
inspire instinctive distrust of his whole “team.” 
Now we arrive at the heart of the prosecution’s case: Rivera’s 
various confessions. This was, in one sense, the strongest evidence of 
guilt in the case. Rivera had told multiple people, including police and 
(allegedly) various other jail inmates, that he was responsible for 
Holly’s death.199 He even signed two written statements that 
purported to recount his confessions to police officers.200 For most 
people, it is common sense to think that an innocent person would 
not willingly admit to committing a crime unless the confession was 
coerced.201 But despite the apparent power of this evidence, it also 
presented serious difficulties for the prosecution. Rivera’s confessions 
to the police initially involved multiple incorrect details that the killer 
would seemingly have gotten right.202 It was only after further 
interrogation that a second statement, which resolved many of the 
inaccuracies, was produced, raising the possibility that the police were 
feeding Rivera details of the crime scene to make his account more 
believable.203 Rivera, moreover, behaved so erratically during the short 
window between his two confessions that he was confined to a padded 
 
198. Cf. Ill. R. Evid. 404(a) (purporting to bar these sorts of inferences); 
Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (permitting evidence of prior acts to be introduced 
for non-propensity purposes). 
199. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57–58. 
200. Id. 
201. But cf. Garrett, supra note 20, at 8 (concluding that over half of the 
forty falsely confessing exonerees who succumbed to police pressure were 
juvenile or mentally disabled); Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: 
Why Innocent People Confess, 32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 525 (2009) 
(discussing the “phenomenon of false confession” and the influence of 
interrogation). 
202. Rivera, for instance, stated initially that Holly had changed into a 
nightgown before their encounter, Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57, but this 
was doubly improbable. Her corpse was wearing a T-shirt, not a 
nightgown, when it was found, and the home in which she was 
murdered was not her own, so there would have been no reason for her 
to have a nightgown there in any event. See Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 
013868, 014773. 
203. See Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 66–67 (concluding that the police had 
provided evidence to Rivera during the investigative process). 
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cell for his own protection, placed on suicide watch by a jailhouse 
nurse, and prescribed antipsychotic medications by a physician.204 
And to the extent that the prosecution claimed he had confessed in 
less pressurized settings, the prosecution was forced to rely on the 
testimony of jailhouse inmates who could be impeached with both 
their prior criminal records and their interest in receiving reduced 
sentences for coming forward.205 
Despite these inconsistencies, the prosecution used the confession 
evidence in a way that would have maximized its associative impact. 
A central feature of the prosecution’s strategy was the relentless 
repetition of details from the confessions. Rather than present each 
confession once or twice, the jury instead heard each confession from 
multiple witnesses’ perspectives, some of whom repeated the 
confession details several times over. For instance, the first witness to 
describe the initial confession, Detective Donald Meadie, started by 
relating the confession as Rivera told it to him, to lay the foundation 
for admitting the written summary Rivera signed. Before concluding, 
Detective Meadie then read that summary aloud to the jury, 
effectively reporting the same confession twice.206 Another witness, 
Sergeant Lou Tessman, went through the same lengthy and repetitive 
process with the subsequent confession.207 Three more officers were 
then called to recount what they had heard and seen during Rivera’s 
two confessions.208 Finally, the prosecution layered on the far less 
detailed confessions related by the two jailhouse informant 
witnesses.209 Thus, the jury was taken through various versions of the 
same story, in various forms and levels of detail, at least nine distinct 
times.  
With this manner of presenting the evidence, the common 
elements among the initial and “corrected” confessions would have 
forged strong associative links through sheer repetition.210 Thus, 
Rivera would have become very strongly linked with the jurors’ 
unconscious representations of Holly, the murder weapon, the 
stabbings, and the scene of the crime. Thinking of any one of these 
 
204. E.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 017138, 017263–64, 017306–08. 
205. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 58, 64–65. 
206. Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 014611–61. 
207. Id. at 014822–93. 
208. Id. at 015446–015518, 015851–66, 015917–67.  
209. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 58, 64–65. 
210. See, e.g., Bechara et al., supra note 130, at 1293–94 (demonstrating 
implicit learning of complex conditional information in a noisy 
environment based on frequent repetition of stimuli); Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, supra note 130, at 347–49 (same); cf. Simon, supra note 
156, at 136 (noting that jurors will often use the “richness” of a 
confession narrative as a proxy for its believability). 
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things would cause a juror to readily and unconsciously bring Rivera’s 
image to mind. In contrast, other details of the confessions conflicted 
and would not have formed equally strong associations. For example, 
Rivera reported staging a break-in in his second statement but not in 
his first one; thus, the jurors would be much less likely to 
automatically associate Rivera with the damage to the door. But 
through punctuated repetition of links between Rivera, the crime 
scene, and Holly, the prosecution made it easy for jurors to imagine 
scenarios of Rivera holding the murder weapon and stabbing Holly 
with it, while making it harder to imagine scenarios where those 
elements did not occur in combination.  
A very different story follows for the defense’s evidence. Although 
it was quite strong analytically, the defense’s case was almost 
certainly much less powerful than the prosecution’s case in terms of 
its ability to forge strong associative links between Rivera and 
innocence or between the crime and another perpetrator.211  
First, the defense tried to paint a contrasting portrait of Rivera 
for the jury, with testimony that portrayed him as a troubled and 
frightened boy rather than a violent, strategic man. As framed by an 
expert psychiatric witness, Rivera’s depression might have induced 
him both to behave recklessly, because he did not value himself very 
much, and to try very hard to please others, because of his low self-
esteem.212 Coupled with an IQ that bordered mental retardation213 and 
a lengthy, stressful police interrogation that left him sleep-deprived 
and nearly psychotic,214 the defense tried to suggest that the 
confession was a desperate attempt to please the investigators by 
telling them whatever they wanted to hear.  
Although this evidence may have provided good reasons to doubt 
the prosecution’s theory of the case, it was less powerful in its ability 
to build a strong set of competing associative connections suggesting 
innocence. Some of the new suggested links might well have helped 
Rivera: connecting him with youth and family,215 or with mental 
 
211. To be clear, I do not intend to impugn the quality of the defense team, 
who operated in a professional and impressive manner throughout the 
trial. Rather, the difficulties arose due to the nature of the defense’s 
evidence, the wide latitude that the prosecution had been given early 
on, and the inability to introduce expert testimony that might have 
weakened the associative force of the confession evidence.  
212. Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 017552–53. 
213. Id. at 017396. 
214. Id. at 017410–23, 017456, 017554. 
215. The defense called Rivera’s parents to provide him with an alibi on the 
night of the murder, and this allowed some discussion of his home life 
with them. See id. at 017693–017710 (questioning Rivera’s father about 
his childhood). The defense also admitted into evidence a picture of 
Rivera as a youth. Id. at 017700. 
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retardation,216 might have served him well because those concepts may 
be associatively linked with innocence. But associating Rivera with 
mental illness or psychosis could have undermined those intuitive 
links because jurors might well connect mental illness and recklessness 
with guilt and antisocial behavior rather than with innocence. 
Additionally, the mere fact that Rivera was required by standard 
practice to present this evidence after the jurors had developed an 
associative network that favored the prosecution’s case meant that 
the defense had an uphill battle to win. Any time that an ambiguous 
fact could be associated with guilt rather than innocence, the 
structure of the preexisting network would make the guilt connections 
easier to form than the innocent ones.217 
Second, the key element of the defense’s case, the exclusionary 
DNA profile, was likewise limited in its ability to speak in terms that 
System 1 could process. The defense offered evidence, from two 
experts, that the semen that had been deposited in Holly’s vagina 
shortly before her death bore a single, unique DNA profile that was 
not attributable to Juan Rivera but rather to an individual the 
defense labeled as “Unknown Male #1.”218 At the level of System 1, 
this evidence built a competing associative link between the 
commission of the crime and this new figure, Unknown Male #1, and 
degraded the existing link with Rivera that had been formed by the 
repetitive confession testimony. But whereas Rivera’s side of the 
 
216. Id. at 017396. 
217. Dan Simon, Chadwick J. Snow, and Stephen J. Read observed a pattern 
like this in a study they conducted to investigate cognitive consistency 
theories. They first exposed participants to a substantial portion of 
evidence in a hypothetical case, while instructing them that more would 
be coming later on. They then obtained from their participants an 
indication of which way the participants were “leaning,” either toward a 
guilty or not-guilty verdict. Finally, they exposed the participants to 
new evidence that was either strongly inculpatory (placing the 
defendant near the scene of the crime) or strongly exculpatory 
(establishing a solid alibi). Although this was not the focus of the study, 
it is noteworthy that two-thirds of the participants who learned 
information strongly inconsistent with their initial leanings ended up 
rendering a verdict decision that aligned with their initial leanings 
rather than with the strong new evidence. Strikingly, this occurred even 
though the initial field of evidence was ambiguous enough to induce a 
balanced number of participants to “lean guilty” and “lean not guilty,” 
suggesting that even prior associations that are relatively weak can 
resist displacement by strong new evidence. Dan Simon, Chadwick J. 
Snow & Shephen J. Read, The Redux of Cognitive Consistency 
Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 814, 824–27 (2004). I am grateful to 
Dan Simon for pointing out this interpretation of their data in 
correspondence.  
218. People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 58–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
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network was richly detailed and thus mutually reinforcing,219 this 
competing family of units would necessarily be weak because only 
minimal detail could be attached to the unknown contributor of the 
semen. Moreover, the strength of the competing connections would 
not be determined merely by the rational probative force of the new 
evidence but also by the frequency and conviction with which key 
witnesses suggested the new associations. On these metrics, the 
defense operated at an inherent disadvantage. Its experts were few in 
number, and its arguments hinged on one single, powerful observation 
rather than a multitude of less probative connections.  
Furthermore, these new connections between the crime and 
Unknown Male #1 were likely weakened significantly by the 
prosecutor’s repeated attempts to elicit from defense witnesses some 
acknowledgment that the exculpatory results could be attributed to 
contamination.220 If conceived as an attempt to elicit evidence 
favorable to the state’s theory of the case, this strategy was a failure 
because no expert was willing to agree that contamination was a 
likely explanation of the forensic results.221 But merely by asking the 
question again and again, the prosecutors built one more connection 
into this new family of units—an unconscious associative link between 
the DNA testimony and the concept of contamination. Contamination 
associates to various negative concepts, such as unreliability, and 
invokes a generally negative emotional effect in connection with the 
DNA evidence. As a result, our jurors would likely have been primed 
to view the DNA evidence as less reliable than it otherwise would be 
and to find thinking about the evidence as slightly more aversive and 
unpleasant than they otherwise would. Thus, despite the judge’s 
repeated instructions to the contrary,222 the arguments and questions 
of counsel would have been integrated into the jurors’ unconscious 
associative models just as readily as actual items of evidence in the 
case. 
At the close of the evidence, the jurors would likely have 
constructed a rich associative model connecting the various items of 
evidence, individuals, and events in the case, based in large part upon 
the frequency with which those elements were encountered in 
combination. Because of this internal tension in the unconscious 
network, it would have been possible for jurors, depending on which 
elements of the case they were focusing on at any one time, to find it 
intuitive to link either Rivera or Unknown Male #1 with Holly’s 
death. But for the reasons described above, the family of units that 
tended to activate “Rivera” and “guilt” simultaneously would tend to 
 
219. See supra Figure 8. 
220. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 59. 
221. Id. 
222. See, e.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018191–93. 
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dominate the network most of the time. As a result, despite the 
serious weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, which are plain from a 
reflective distance, a juror who sat through the Rivera trial could 
easily have found a verdict of guilty more intuitively plausible than a 
verdict of acquittal. 
D. The Role of System 2 Reasoning in Shaping the Rivera Verdict 
In the account I just outlined, a judge or juror listening to a case 
can be thought of as building an unconscious associative network, 
which links the people, events, and concepts involved in the case in a 
network of excitatory and inhibitory relationships. This associative 
model, once formed, functions by outputting intuitive feelings about 
the facts of the case. But this System 1 cognitive activity is far from 
the whole picture of how a fact finder will reach a verdict. In addition 
to relying on their intuition, fact finders also employ the conscious 
and effortful thinking styles that characterize System 2 cognition. 
Depending on their motivations, fact finders might employ this type 
of thinking either to advance their intuitive preferences or to resist 
them.223 In this section, I explore some of the roles that this form of 
cognition might have played as the jury deliberated the right result in 
Rivera’s case, and, in particular, how System 2 may have been 
employed to override any remaining doubts as the jury deliberated in 
Rivera’s case. 
We should begin by recognizing that some cases may require little 
System 2 involvement by jurors. If, after hearing the evidence, the 
right answer seems obvious and the law does not require a reasoned 
explanation for the decision, a juror might vote for her strong 
intuitive preference without engaging in much explicit thought or 
discussion. We know, however, that the Rivera jury members did not 
find the case easy or obvious: they deliberated for several days and 
sent multiple notes to the judge during deliberations indicating that 
they were finding it difficult to reach agreement.224 Thus, many of the 
jurors were likely experiencing either an internal associative conflict or 
a conflict with the intuitions of other jurors, and would have needed 
to deploy System 2 resources in order to establish both internal and 
external consensus about the verdict.  
System 2 cognition may take several forms during the fact-finding 
process. First, a fact finder will often find it useful to construct a 
narrative to assist in deciding a case. Such narratives will organize the 
facts of the case into “episode structures” that focus on chains of 
cause and effect—particularly on the goals, choices, and actions of key 
individuals in the case—rather than on the simpler correlational 
information that forms the basis for the associative mechanisms 
 
223. See discussion supra Part II. 
224. E.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018205, 018255, 018269–70, 018301. 
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described earlier.225 In some cases, these narratives might be 
articulated only in a fact finder’s mind, as she strings together 
individual aspects of the case in her working memory. In other cases, 
the fact finder might communicate a narrative to others, either in oral 
form (such as during jury deliberations) or in writing (as in the case 
of a judicial opinion following a bench trial).226 Given the secrecy of 
juror deliberations under modern law,227 we will never know for sure 
whether the Rivera jurors found it useful to organize their thoughts 
about the case into narrative form, but, given the case’s complexity, 
it seems quite likely. 
Narrative explanations will generally integrate both aspects of the 
evidence actually heard during trial and “gap-filling” material that 
helps to complete a particular aspect of a case’s story.228 Such gaps 
might arise for many reasons. Sometimes the evidence may not have 
included information that is necessary to help explain or justify a 
decision. At other times, necessary information may have been 
presented but then forgotten in the deluge of details that so often 
accompany a complicated case. Thus, a story favoring the prosecution 
that attempted to be consistent with the DNA forensic testimony 
would require a juror to rely on assumptions regarding how, exactly, 
an eleven-year-old girl had managed to die with semen in her vagina 
that was not attributable to the person who raped and killed her. By 
contrast, a story favoring the defense would require gap-filling 
regarding why Rivera would have fabricated a fake alibi if he had a 
real one available. As with any difficult case, neither side’s narrative 
was free of gaps or inconsistencies. 
When fact finders engage in gap-filling, we can expect cooperative 
involvement by both cognitive systems. System 2 constructs an 
explicit story based on the fact finder’s memory of the evidence, while 
System 1 fills the gaps by supplying intuitions about what the 
“missing pieces” are likely to be. Similarly, there may be a need to 
address conflicting testimony when constructing explanatory stories. 
Such choices will often be made based on an intuitive sense of which 
 
225. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 67, at 248–51 (describing the 
episode structure of cause and effect); cf. Sloman, supra note 117, at 4 
(describing an “associative system” of reasoning for comparison with a 
“rules based” system). 
226. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring findings of fact to be set forth 
in the record when a judge rules following a bench trial); Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 23(c) (requiring findings of fact to be set forth in the record following 
a bench trial if a party requests the judge to do so before the verdict is 
rendered). 
227. See Ill. R. Evid. 606(b) (prohibiting courts from requiring jurors to 
testify regarding jury deliberations). 
228. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 67, at 249 (noting that jurors fill 
in gaps in testimony to construct complete episodes). 
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witnesses are believable or which narrative chains are more likely to 
occur in the real world. Once again, we might expect a fact finder to 
resolve such disputes in part by choosing the version that intuitively 
feels right.229  
Saying that System 1 may help to shape the narrative that a fact 
finder will find acceptable is not to say that it will so dominate the 
process that the construction of a narrative will never causally affect 
the outcome. A different jury hearing the Rivera case might also have 
felt an associatively derived intuition that Rivera “felt” like a guilty 
person. But that jury might have found that the hypothesis of guilt 
was impossible to square with any articulable story, perhaps due to 
the difficulty of constructing a plausible narrative of guilt that 
explains the DNA evidence. In such a circumstance, the hypothetical 
jurors might have the persistent intuition that the defendant is 
somehow “getting away with something” yet still decide to vote for 
acquittal. 
In addition to constructing solitary narratives, some fact finders 
might take this process a step further by engaging in an explicit 
process of comparison between narratives favoring the prosecution 
and defense. Thus, in a case like Rivera’s, a juror might feel that 
neither the State’s nor the defense’s theory of the case can be rejected 
outright because both are supported by some persuasive evidence. In 
such cases, one sensible way to proceed is to engage in abductive 
reasoning—imagining alternatively that each party’s story is actually 
true and considering how well those stories would explain the given 
pattern of evidence.230 Thus, Professors Allen and Pardo’s explanatory 
conception of the proof process, which was offered as an epistemic and 
normative model for what proper evidential reasoning should look 
like,231 will in some cases form an important part of a juror’s reasoning 
process, as a descriptive matter.  
 
229. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 190–91 (noting that 
judgments of story coherence will depend on whether the story is 
consistent, plausible, and complete). 
230. See Cheng, supra note 3, at 1266–68 (proposing the use of the 
preponderance standard as a ratio test that compares the probability of 
the narratives offered by the plaintiff and defendant); Pardo, supra note 
39, at 596–97 (discussing an alternative conception that focuses on 
potential explanations of the evidence). 
231. Although Pardo and Allen sometimes labeled their model as 
“descriptive,” e.g., Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 226, they do not use 
that term in the way that I am employing it in this Article. Whereas I 
conceive of descriptive models as attempting to describe real-world 
reasoning practices, they initially developed their model as an attempt 
to “expla[in] the legal proof process and its features,” id. at 268, in a 
primarily epistemic sense. Compare id., with discussion supra Part I. 
Thus, as Pardo clarifies in later work, he does not believe that the 
explanatory theory of the proof process could be falsified by contrary 
empirical data regarding real-world fact-finding practices; rather, it 
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When placed within the context of a dual-process framework, 
abductive reasoning might work either to further associative intuitions 
or to restrain them, depending both on the cognitive complexity of 
the case and the extent to which the fact finder is motivated to either 
defend or resist her own intuitions. Like the simple story construction 
discussed above, the process of abduction will necessarily demand 
System 2 resources. The associative model, after all, is unitary and 
holistic, and it cannot be instantly restructured by a simple act of 
imagination.232 Rather, our fact finder must employ mental effort to 
imagine a world in which the key facts alleged by one party are true 
and focus on the likely pattern of evidence she would expect to see in 
that world.233  
Some elements of this process might involve further System 2 
thinking in the form of explicit logical inferences. Often, however, the 
abductive process will also depend on associative intuitions. It seems 
likely that many jurors, if forced to choose between competing 
plausible explanations, would proceed by imagining alternatively that 
each story was true and then gauging which one feels more “right” at 
a gut level. If the process takes this intuitive form rather than a more 
analytical style, then the process of abduction will be substantially 
constrained by the preexisting structure of the fact finder’s associative 
network. In such instances, the use of abduction will tend to act in a 
justificatory fashion rather than as a meaningful constraint on the 
answer produced by System 1. Therefore, in cases where jurors engage 
in an explicit comparison of stories, that process may have no causal 
impact on the result except when jurors are motivated to question 
and reconsider their intuitive judgments. 
System 2 cognition may also give effect to legal rules that 
constrain fact finders to reach results that do not necessarily accord 
with their straightforward intuitions, such as burdens of proof. In civil 
 
provides normative guidance when it conflicts with such practices. See 
Pardo, supra note 39, at 598–99. This means that their theory would be 
more clearly classified as normative—rather than descriptive or 
doctrinal—when situated in my own typology. Understood in this light, 
the discussion above is meant to explore the extent to which Pardo and 
Allen’s normative conception of epistemically proper fact-finding 
processes are realized in practice, an inquiry which is related to, but 
distinct from, the central goals of their work. I am indebted to Mike 
Pardo for useful correspondence on this point. 
232. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 66–67; Jonathan St. B. T. Evans et al., 
A Theory of Hypothetical Thinking, in Thinking: Psychological 
Perspectives on Reasoning, Judgment, and Decision Making 3, 
4–10 (David Hardman & Laura Maachi eds., 2003). 
233. Cf. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234–35 (noting that fact finders 
decide based on the relative plausibility of the versions of events put 
forth by the parties and additional ones constructed by themselves or 
fellow jurors).  
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cases, which are typically resolved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, this will rarely have a significant impact on a juror’s verdict 
choice because a juror whose associative intuition favors guilt will 
generally feel that guilt is more probable than not.234 In criminal 
cases, the requirement of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” will 
create a more complicated dialogue between the two systems of 
reasoning.235 A juror who wishes to follow this instruction faithfully 
may be motivated to resist a weakly dominant associative impulse 
regarding a case’s outcome.  
Thus, even if Rivera felt more guilty than innocent to most of the 
jurors in his case, there were likely enough competing associations 
raised by the defense that the jurors would have initially felt some 
discomfort going along with their dominant intuition. By giving a 
reasonable doubt instruction, a judge effectively urges that if a juror 
has conflicting intuitions that are both strong enough to count as 
“reasonable,” then the juror should choose innocence, even if she feels 
a stronger intuitive pull toward finding the defendant guilty.236 In 
some cases, this instruction may be effective in initiating a System 2 
override of the dominant System 1 impulse, but we face a competing 
possibility: jurors might try to resolve the conflict not by overriding 
their dominant intuitions but instead by crafting arguments that help 
to put their doubts to rest. If jurors were to spend a significant 
amount of time exploring reasons to discount the defense’s theory of 
the case, they might, through a new process of repetition, strengthen 
their intuitions concerning guilt and weaken the associative 
connections with innocence.237 With sufficient time and effort, the 
jurors might discover that they no longer felt any “reasonable doubts” 
after all. 
This framework might well explain how the Rivera jury, after four 
days of deliberation, was able to arrive at a result that seems 
impossible to square with the reasonable doubt instruction. Much of 
the time may have been spent not in trying to craft reasons to resist 
their intuitions, but instead trying to minimize the reasons the 
defense had given for doubting that their intuitions were correct. For 
instance, with sufficient discussion of the idea that the forensic 
evidence was contaminated, the jurors might have slowly degraded 
the associations between the DNA evidence and Rivera’s innocence, 
 
234. See 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 3:5 (3d ed. 2007). 
235. Id. at § 3:17.  
236. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 238–39. 
237. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and 
Controlled Components, 56 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 15–
16 (1989) (discussing the use of repeated invocation of contrary belief 
structures to weaken a preexisting associative stereotype). 
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making it easier to silence their internal doubts regarding his guilt. By 
repeating a story to themselves with sufficient frequency, in other 
words, the jurors may have come to believe it despite its lack of 
foundation in evidence.238 
When we pull these different strands of System 2 cognition 
together, the resulting picture may seem murky. System 2 can play a 
role in evidential inference through the construction of narratives or 
arguments, through the analysis of hypothetical scenarios framed 
around the parties’ theories, through explicit burden-of-persuasion 
rules, or through the implementation of limiting instructions. In all of 
these different guises, however, there is a common theme. Two 
interacting forces will shape System 2’s effects: (1) the case-specific 
intuitions that derive from the fact finder’s associative model and 
(2) the motivational forces that encourage the fact finder to either 
follow those intuitions wherever they might lead or, alternatively, to 
resist the intuitions using one of the above-described strategies. 
Globally, this interaction means that the standard approaches to 
modeling fact-finding, which focus on the probabilistic or plausible 
force of evidence to the exclusion of motivational influences, will often 
fail to explain the results that jurors are likely to reach on a given set 
of evidence. It also implies that we will not be able to dissolve the 
link between flawed intuitions and erroneous outcomes simply by 
encouraging more reflection, as some have argued.239 The Rivera jury, 
after all, reflected for four days before returning a deeply flawed 
verdict. Rather, we have two options. We can try to shape the fact-
finding process so that problematic intuitions are less likely to arise in 
the first place. But if that fails, we must do more than just induce 
fact finders to reflect before deciding—we must motivate them to 
view their own intuitions from a detached distance.  
IV. Professor Cohen’s Gatecrashers, or:  
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and  
Love Statistical Evidence 
In Part III, I offered a general account of the roles that both 
System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes play in the realm of legal 
fact-finding, using the case of People v. Rivera as an extended 
example. Examining the case in these terms, I believe, helps to 
explain the seemingly inexplicable willingness of twelve jurors to find 
a man guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of rape and murder when 
exculpatory DNA evidence clearly implicated an unknown third party 
instead. This initial use of the dual-process model focused on its 
unique descriptive power in explaining the ways in which jury 
 
238. See id. 
239. See Guthrie et al., supra note 27, at 29–40. 
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intuitions might diverge from normative rationality, and the ways in 
which they might use their deliberative faculties to further those 
intuitions rather than resist them. Although the primary goal of the 
dual-process model is descriptive, achieving better understandings of 
the sources of our intuitive judgments about evidence has important 
normative benefits as well. Going forward, I hope to show that 
thinking of fact-finding in dual-process terms can also be helpful when 
we address some of the common puzzles that have frustrated evidence 
theorists when they have attempted to formulate models of 
normatively justifiable trial results. In this final section, I will focus 
on one such conundrum—the longstanding debate over the proper 
probative force of naked statistical evidence.240 The dual-process 
model of fact-finding does not directly tell us whether such evidence 
should be trusted, but it does suggest that the widespread intuitive 
distrust of verdicts that rest on purely statistical inferences about 
guilt or liability may arise from the inability of such evidence to speak 
in terms that our intuition can understand. As a result, theorists may 
find themselves seeking to justify normatively suboptimal trial 
outcomes out of a desire to defend intuitions that are not themselves 
particularly trustworthy. 
Recall Cohen’s paradox of the gatecrasher.241 A thousand people 
went to the rodeo, but only 499 of them bought tickets. We know, 
therefore, that 501 of them crashed the gate. Unfortunately, we 
assume in this hypothetical that this is the limit of our knowledge; no 
further evidence exists to discriminate between paying customers and 
gatecrashers.242 As Cohen argues, “the balance of probability” would 
support finding any randomly chosen attendee guilty if the rodeo 
organizer sued to collect the ticket price, because there is a 0.501 
chance that any randomly chosen patron was ticketless that night. 
But, he maintains, this result would be an “absurd injustice,” with 
the result that no judge or jury would ever convict a person under 
such circumstances.243 Indeed, some courts have disallowed parties 
 
240. By “naked” statistical evidence, I am referring to evidence that arrives 
in a plainly statistical form; that is, it involves transparent and 
quantifiable uncertainty. Although all sources of evidence do involve 
some inherent uncertainties, and although neither explicitly statistical or 
facially non-statistical evidence can be said to be superior as an a priori 
matter, Pardo, supra note 39, at 573, the admissibility and probative 
force of naked statistics in trials has been a subject of lengthy and 
heated debate in the evidence literature. See generally Amit Pundik, 
What is Wrong with Statistical Evidence? The Attempts to Establish an 
Epistemic Deficiency, 27 Civ. Just. Q. 461 (reviewing literature). 
241. Cohen, supra note 36, at 75.  
242. Id. 
243. Id.; see also Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive 
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1187, 1192–94 
(1979) (developing the similarly structured “Prison Yard” hypothetical); 
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from using purely statistical evidence when parties seek to prove 
whether a specific event in the past has actually occurred.244  
A number of scholars have attempted to justify this sort of 
intuition through analytic argument. Some have focused on the idea 
that we can rationally draw some sort of “negative inference” from 
the fact that more evidence was not offered, effectively concluding 
that the plaintiff is hiding evidence.245 This seems, in the end, to 
dodge the hypothetical, which is designed to force us to decide what a 
fact finder should do when statistical evidence is the only source of 
information.246 In that world, the rodeo organizer is not spoliating any 
evidence and could not have found more even if motivated to do so, 
so it would be senseless to punish the plaintiff for the first failure and 
pointless to incentivize him or others to try harder in future, similar 
cases.  
Other theorists, including Jonathan Cohen, Alex Stein, and, more 
recently, Edward Cheng, relying on the idea that purely statistical 
proof lacks any individualized force against a particular defendant, 
argue that the balance in such cases is purely even.247 As Cheng puts 
it, we would encounter the same evidence whether the defendant was 
innocent or guilty, so we have an equal probability of observing it 
either way.248 But this argument suffers from two flaws. First, is it 
really the case that we would be equally likely to observe the same 
ratios either way? Perhaps not. The situation is analogous to our 
position after being given a coin with an unknown bias, flipping it 
once, and getting heads. It seems more likely, in such a circumstance, 
that the coin is biased toward heads than tails, even though either is 
within the realm of possibility. Similarly, it seems more likely that we 
would observe a 501/499 ratio of crashers to payees in the case of a 
particular defendant’s liability than innocence, given that we should 
 
Tribe, supra note 36, at 1340–41 (developing the similar “Blue Bus” 
hypothetical). 
244. See, e.g., Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 
1940) (finding that proving a proposition is mathematically favorable is 
not enough to prove preponderance of the evidence); People v. Risley, 
108 N.E. 200, 203 (N.Y. 1915) (holding the lower court erred in allowing 
testimony regarding probability). 
245. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 2, at 106; Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan L. Rev. 1477, 1508–10 
(1999); Tribe, supra note 36, at 1349.  
246. See Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. 
L. Rev. 401, 411–12. 
247. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 271; Alex Stein, Foundations of 
Evidence Law 82–83 (2005); Cheng, supra note 3, at 1269–71; 
cf. Allen, supra note 246, at 414 (critiquing this line of analysis). 
248. Cheng, supra note 3, at 1270. 
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expect more guilty “flips” in a world biased toward gatecrashers than 
in a world biased toward payees.  
The second flaw in the “no individualized force” argument is that, 
even if we thought that the likelihood of observing this evidence was 
equivalent either way, this still does not mean that the information is 
useless. As Professors Cheng and Cohen both acknowledge, it is more 
likely than not that even a randomly chosen defendant did, in fact, 
crash the gate.249 In that sense, we do know something about the 
defendant as an individual, although it happens to be the case that 
we know the same thing about all the other rodeo attendees. The fact 
that this logic, if applied in the aggregate, will lead to far too much 
compensation for the rodeo is immaterial; after all, if we applied 
Cohen’s preferred rule of no-liability the outcome would be even more 
unjust in the opposite direction.250  
My point in referencing this ongoing discussion is not, however, to 
present a knock-down argument as to whether we should or should 
not find a defendant guilty in the scenario Professor Cohen envisions 
(or others like it). Instead, I suggest that thinking of this and other 
similar examples in dual-process terms may reframe the debate and 
reveal the potential dangers of relying on intuition as a guide toward 
optimal decision making. Imagine, for a moment, a judge or juror who 
heard a case that is as simple and short as Cohen described, with the 
entire case amounting to little more than a recitation of the facts of 
the number of tickets sold and the number of rodeo attendees, plus 
some proof that the defendant was an attendee. Such testimony, given 
its relatively abstract nature, would support only a minimal 
associative model, as illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
 
249. Cohen, supra note 36, at 75; Cheng, supra note 3, at 1270. 
250. See Allen, supra note 246, at 413 (finding that Professor Cohen’s rule 
would result in a situation where “denying recovery results in a larger 
windfall, overall, to the defendants”). 
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FIGURE 9: An associative model of the gatecrashers scenario with 
neither sub-network dominating. 
In a model like this, neither the liable-gatecrasher nor the 
innocent-payee sub-networks would tend to dominate, because neither 
the one nor the other occupied a greater length of time at trial or was 
mentioned more frequently in connection with the defendant. Rather, 
they both are connected to the defendant with approximately equal 
associative weight. As a result, a fact finder trying to decide what to 
do in such a case would likely find that their intuitions are silent. 
Either finding the defendant liable or not liable feels unsupported, so 
that the jurors do not feel like they know what happened to any level 
of certainty.  
The only answer that can be given in such a scenario must arise 
from System 2 cognition. Perhaps, like Cohen, a judge or juror would 
likely be inclined to preserve the status quo in the absence of a felt 
conviction that the defendant did something wrong. Or perhaps, as 
some courts have suggested, it is proper to defer to a mathematical 
calculation indicating guilt or liability so long as that calculation is 
rational and supported by a proper foundation in evidence, even if it 
feels intuitively unsupported.251 So, unfortunately, just initiating 
System 2 processing will not determine a unique outcome. 
But one thing is clearer now than it might have been before: we 
might not want to give any special deference to our intuitive 
judgments in a case like this. The example, by construction, is novel 
and foreign to our prior experience, so our past associations are 
unlikely to provide any useful guide to resolving the case. The fact 
that our associative network would not produce a dominant and 
coherent result may not reveal any deep truths about the proper 
resolution of a case like this. Instead, it might merely demonstrate 
 
251. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38–39 (Cal. 1968).  
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System 1’s inability to compute appropriate answers to problems that 
are framed probabilistically.252  
To see why this is the case, imagine an individual, Isabelle, who 
rarely flies and rarely reads about safe air travel but watches a steady 
diet of nightly news. Now imagine further that the local nightly news 
show always covers airplane crashes, wherever they occur in the 
world, because they make for dramatic viewing. What result is likely 
to arise? Well, Isabelle will have relatively few associations between 
air travel and safety (because she does not fly very often), but she will 
have developed relatively strong associations between air travel and 
danger because she often thinks about air travel in the context of the 
disaster reports. The plausible result is that she feels tense and 
nervous when she thinks about air travel and easily imagines scenes of 
disaster—despite the fact that air travel is statistically quite safe and 
that those reported disasters compose a vanishingly small fraction of 
airplane trips. And because the unconscious system is trained by 
patterns of co-occurring stimuli rather than explicit semantic 
instructions, this could be the case even if Isabelle has been informed 
that air travel is safer than driving, as a statistical matter.  
Isabelle’s case illustrates a more general truth about the limits of 
the intuitive judgments that our dual-process minds can generate. 
Isabelle’s intuition was not a reliable guide to choosing a safe means 
of air travel because it was trained on a non-representative sample of 
co-occurrences between airplanes and accidents. This suggests a 
broader principle: intuition may be a good guide when it incorporates 
a fair quantity of representative and domain-specific experience, but 
in other cases, it may be useless or even actively wrong.  
Applying this principle to Cohen and company’s intuitions about 
the gatecrasher case, we should see cause for concern. Logically, an 
individual fact finder would have a similarly indeterminate set of 
intuitions about the outcome of a gatecrasher case—whether the 
payee/crasher ratio was 499/501, 400/600, or 600/400—because the 
numbers alone would not lead either party to elaborate its case with 
more detail, repetition, or vividness. But those differences, it seems, 
should matter, at least if we want to minimize the social costs of 
errors in the trial process. It is meaningfully different, from the 
perspective of social cost, whether we are erring in forty percent 
versus sixty percent of similarly situated cases, even if our 
associatively generated intuitions were the same across the board.253  
 
252. See generally Kahneman, supra note 28, at 109–18 (cataloging the 
limited ability of System 1 to generate useful intuitions to statistically 
framed questions). 
253. See Allen, supra note 246, at 413 (noting that awarding victory to the 
defendant in the rodeo case results in a suboptimal allocation of the risk 
of error).  
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As a result, it might be worthwhile to treat our intuitions about 
purely statistical proof with care and caution. The dual-process 
framework, as a descriptive matter, provides strong support for the 
idea that real-world fact finders will generally be reluctant to sanction 
a defendant based on statistical evidence alone because their 
associative intuitions will provide no encouragement toward such a 
result. But this descriptive account cannot teach us what the best 
normative approach toward handling such cases would be.254 To 
decide what jurors ought to do, we would ideally decide to defer to 
some source of information that does incorporate relevant 
considerations of social costs, such as the rate of errors likely under 
different frameworks, the costs of those errors, and the impact of 
differing rules on the system’s legitimacy or efficiency.255  
Our intuitions about naked statistical proof are likely to be 
inapposite to such goals, unfortunately. First, there are not many 
cases in ordinary trial practice where naked statistics play a 
significant role. Second, our system of trial by a lay jury further 
reduces the extent to which such cases can be used to develop reliable 
intuitions. Third, and most importantly, even if jurors and judges 
were exposed to such cases with some frequency, they would not get 
reliable feedback about outcome accuracy, so there would be little 
means of training their intuitions to produce reliable outcomes. 256 In 
short, it seems that the gatecrasher case is unable to generate strong 
intuitions regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence, but it is 
doubtful that this intuitive void has any deep meaning in terms of the 
accuracy or fairness of the outcome. This suggests that the only 
“paradox” that the gatecrashers present is this: Why does it feel so 
wrong to do what is right, which is to ignore our intuitions, do the 
math, and require a defendant who probably jumped a turnstile to 
pay for his seat at the rodeo? 
Conclusion 
In this Article, I have tried to elaborate a dual-process account of 
fact-finding and to illustrate why such an approach is valuable. The 
dual-process view lays bare a hidden feature of fact-finding that has 
received little attention in most existing formal and informal models 
of the proof process—the significant role played by unconscious 
 
254. See Simon, supra note 5, at 550–59 (urging that a coherence network 
model might function well descriptively but that its outputs were not 
necessarily a good guide to normatively correct inference). 
255. See Pundik, supra note 240, at 463 (urging that we need a normative 
model, not a descriptive one, if we are to draw inferences about the 
desirability of using naked statistical evidence).  
256. See Mark Spottswood, Evidence-Based Litigation Reform, 51 U. 
Louisville L. Rev. 25, 27 (2012). 
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associative cognitive processes in constraining and generating verdict 
decisions. System 1 can make a wrong decision feel right, as seen with 
Rivera, and a potentially right decision feel wrong, as seen with naked 
statistical data. But System 1 processes fly under the radar because 
they are not subject to our conscious awareness or control. Their 
effects can be hard to predict because they operate according to a 
logic that sometimes defies common-sense ideas about fair and 
accurate decision making. In the universe of the unconscious 
associative system, two concepts can become connected based on their 
mere co-occurrence in our sensory environments, and those 
associations will cause us to expect to see those stimuli together in the 
future. This simple fact of human nature has radical implications for 
legal fact-finding: it means that jurors will draw inferences in ways 
that disregard the legal separation between what is and what is not 
“evidence” in the courtroom; treat the frequency of evidential 
combinations as significant, even if it bears no real relation to that 
evidence’s probative force; and be more receptive to evidence and 
arguments when they go along with our (sometimes biased) 
preexisting, unconscious expectations. 
These new ways of understanding fact-finding cognition are not 
mere academic curiosities, however. Rivera shows us that associative 
cognition can play a powerful role in shaping our decisions and can 
lead to results that we might not endorse from a reflective distance. 
In that case, the prosecutor took a case that seemed like a loser and 
presented it in a way that powerfully captured a jury’s intuitions, 
arriving at a result that few observers would have predicted. Whether 
we wish to exploit this effect as lawyers, understand it as scholars, or 
prevent it from recurring as regulators of the trial environment, we all 
share an interest in understanding what kinds of evidence are likely to 
bring about unreliable or unfair intuitive judgments. To that end, I 
hope that considering the jury’s view of the case from a dual-process 
point of view has been illuminating.  
  
 
   
